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Nederlandstalige samenvatting
Dit doctoraal proefschrift is een collectie van vier essays die bijdra-
gen tot een specifiek veld in “finance” genaamd “market microstructure”.
Dit studieveld onderzoekt aspecten omtrent marktstructuren, -efficiëntie,
liquiditeit en de dynamiek waarbij nieuwe informatie via reacties van
verschillende marktparticipanten in de prijs wordt verdisconteerd. Het
wijkt af van de basisstelling van volledig perfecte en efficiënte markten
en start van het idee van non-frictieloze markten. Het onderzoeksveld
analyseert de verschillende oorzaken die kunnen leiden tot tijdelijke di-
vergenties van de werkelijke fundamentele prijs, aldus is de studie van
de “market microstructure” relevant zowel in een academische als in een
pure trading gerelateerde omgeving.
Het eerste hoofdstuk onderzoekt de impact van data frequentie op de
“intraday” winstgevendheid van meer dan 8000 “technical trading rules”
gebruikmakend van een ongeëxploreerde en unieke intraday dataset voor
de Russische Roebel-US Dollar wisselkoersmarkt. De resultaten tonen
aan dat winsten voortgebracht door deze technische handelsregels vaker
voorkomen op een hoge trading frequentie. Evenwel verdwijnt de winst-
gevendheid na correctie voor echte gerealiseerde transactiekosten. Des-
ondanks vinden we dat “technical trading rules” die toegepast worden
op een voldoende hoge trading frequentie superieure rendementen kun-
nen opleveren in periodes waarbij een centrale bank een stabiliserend
wisselkoersbeleid voert.
Het tweede hoofdstuk onderzoekt de mogelijke drijvers van “intra-
day momentum”, welke gedefinieerd is als een significante positieve re-
latie tussen het eerste en het laatste halfuur rendement. Op basis van
dezelfde wisselkoersdataset voor de periode 2005 tot 2014, analyseren
we de mogelijke drijvers van dit effect. Onze resultaten suggereren dat
“intraday momentum” in de Roebelmarkt veroorzaakt wordt door risi-
coaversie t.o.v. het aanhouden van posities door liquiditeitsverschaffers
doorheen de nacht. Bijkomend staven onze resultaten voorgaande stud-
ies die claimen dat marktconcentratie als gevolg van handelsuren be-
langrijk zijn voor “intraday momentum”, alsook dat dit effect sterker is
tijdens crisissen.
In het derde hoofdstuk analyseren we de verschillende componenten
van de “bid-ask spread” aan de hand van een decompositie model ont-
worpen voor ordergedreven markten. Ons onderzoek toont aan dat bijna
de helft van de “bid-ask spread” toe te schrijven is aan adverse selectie
waarvan het relatief belang daalt over de tijd. Dit suggereert dat zowel
“market coverage” gestegen is als dat informatieassymetrieën gedaald
zijn. Tot slot vinden we dat tijdens periodes van financiële stress, zoals
onder meer tijdens de Russische crisis van 2014, marktparticipanten een
substantieel hogere bescherming tegen adverse selectie eisen.
In het vierde hoofdstuk onderzoeken we de prestatie van verschil-
lende trade classificatie regels. Onze resultaten suggereren dat bepaalde
nieuwe transactie gebaseerde classificatie regels een substantiële verbe-
tering t.o.v. het standaard Lee en Ready classificatie algoritme voort-
brengen. Deze verbetering is het gevolg van een hogere classificatiekracht
bij transacties die binnenin de quotes plaatsvinden. Ook de bulk volume
classificatieregel presteert adequaat doch slechter dan de traditionele
“tick-by-tick” classificatieregels.
English summary
This PhD dissertation is a collection of four essays that contribute to
a particular field in finance namely market microstructure. The study of
market microstructure deals with the design and functioning of financial
markets, market efficiency, liquidity and the dynamics by which new in-
formation is discounted into prices through various market participants.
It differs from the basic paradigm of fully perfect and efficient markets
and starts from the idea of non-frictionless markets. Hence, the field
investigates various aspects like informed trading and liquidity which
are among the factors that cause asset prices to converge or temporarily
diverge from their true fundamental price.
The first chapter examines the use and profitability of technical trad-
ing rules on a high frequency basis by using an extensive and unexplored
sample of intraday data for the Russian Ruble-US Dollar foreign ex-
change market. The results indicate that technical trading profits seem
much more present on a higher frequency basis. The adjustment for real,
rather than estimated transaction costs wipes away most of the profits.
However, we do find evidence that technical trading rules applied at a
sufficiently high frequency generate superior returns when the central
bank conducts a stabilizing exchange rate policy.
The second chapter investigates the likely drivers of ‘intraday momen-
tum’, which is defined as a significantly positive relationship between the
first half-hour and the last half-hour return. Using the same data set
for the period between 2005 and 2014, we analyze the likely drivers of
this effect. Our results suggest that intraday momentum in the Ruble
market is induced by risk aversion to overnight holdings among liquidity
providers. In addition, our results complement earlier findings that sug-
gest that market concentration due to trading hours matters for intraday
momentum and that the effect is more pronounced during crises.
The third chapter applies a spread decomposition model to analyze
the bid-ask spread components for a novel foreign exchange market data
set. We find that almost half of the spread is attributable to adverse
selection which relative importance decreases over time. This is indica-
tive of lower information asymmetries and higher market coverage over
the period. During periods of financial stress, a substantial increase in
market participants’ demand for protection against adverse selection is
found during the Russian crisis of 2014.
In the fourth chapter, we assess the accuracy of various trade classi-
fication rules which is of relevance for trade classification in other high-
frequency data sets where the trade indicator information is absent. Our
results suggest that certain novel classifications rules offer substantial im-
provements over standard used Lee and Ready classification algorithm.
This is due to higher classifying power for trades occurring inside quotes.
The bulk volume classification rule performs reasonably well albeit worse
than the traditional tick-by-tick rules.
Chapter 1
Does Frequency Matter
for Intraday Technical
Trading?1
Finance Research Letters August 2016, Vol. 18, 177-183
1.1 Introduction
The use of technical analysis, which uses past prices to guide trading
decisions, is strongly contested by many academics (Malkiel, 1996) due
to its head to head position with the efficient market hypothesis. Never-
theless, surveys show that technical analysis still is a popular technique
in the financial industry, particularly in the foreign exchange market.
In a seminal paper, Taylor and Allen (1992) found that 94% of foreign
exchange dealers in London used some form of technical analysis over
short horizons which is confirmed by subsequent research (Menkhoff,
1997; Lui and Mole, 1998; Oberlechner, 2001; Cheung and Chinn, 2001;
Cheung et al., 2004; Gehrig and Menkhoff, 2006; Menkhoff and Taylor,
2007). The fact that technical analysis is most heavily used on the for-
eign exchange market, is surprising at first sight, since this market is
dominated by professional traders. However, the market shows various
characteristics making it prone for technical analysis. First, the share
of short-term (inter-dealer) trading is significantly higher than in other
financial markets (Lyons, 2001). Second, there is a plethora of compet-
ing fundamental models and this lack of a consensus model may be a
1This chapter is bassed on joint work with Michael Frömmel (Ghent University)
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reason for the popularity of technical analysis on foreign exchange mar-
kets (Menkhoff and Taylor, 2007). Third, central bank interventions on
the foreign exchange market may produce exploitable technical trading
opportunities (Saacke, 2002). Fourth, the forthcoming profits from the
use of technical trading rules and exchange rate fluctuations are self-
reinforcing (Schulmeister, 2006).
The empirical literature highlights that technical trading rules are
more profitable in emerging economies and on the foreign exchange mar-
ket. Park and Irwin (2007) report almost 100 ‘modern’ studies between
1988 and 2004 and find annual net profits of 10-30% for emerging mar-
kets and 5-10% for the foreign exchange market. The former could be
attributed to lower market efficiency in emerging markets due to less in-
tense competition, a lower number of market participants (Lo, 2004) and
the lack of sufficient publicly available information (Bessembinder and
Chan, 1995). More recently, Neely and Weller (2013) argue that trading
rule returns in foreign exchange markets remain significant but shifted
towards emerging markets. Also Chang et al. (2014) find evidence for the
profitability of moving average trading rules for emerging stock markets.
Another argument highlights that the practice could have had merit in
any market but that its profitability decreased over time (Olson, 2004;
Qi and Wu, 2006; Schulmeister, 2009) driven by a continuous increase in
market efficiency or to environmental changes suggested by the adaptive
market hypothesis (Lo, 2004).
Despite the reported use on short term technical trading (Menkhoff
and Taylor, 2007), the majority of empirical research is based on daily or
lower frequency data, whereas only 6 out of 92 reported modern studies
used intraday data (Park and Irwin, 2007). Furthermore, none of these
studies examine the effect of trading frequency on technical trading prof-
itability. Hence, this paper contributes at least fourfold to the literature
by performing an intraday study on the Russian Ruble-US Dollar cur-
rency market. First, we analyze the profitability and hence focus on an
emerging economy’s exchange rate, therefore combining the two most
promising markets in terms of profitable technical analysis. Second, our
data set covers a long time span of more than ten years and is tick-by-
tick data, thus collected at the highest possible frequency. Therefore the
data set allows us to (i) observe how the profitability evolved over time
and (ii) to sample the data at any desired frequency. Third, in con-
trast to existing studies, we observe the best bid and ask prices which
makes it possible to apply the real transaction costs at any point in
time, even if these are time-varying. Fourth and finally, we apply the
recently developed statistical test by Hansen (2005) for statistical infer-
ence that applies multiple testing corrections for data snooping (Harvey
2
et al., 2016). In summary, our analysis does not provide evidence that
simple technical trading rules consistently generate superior returns in a
context where they are argued to flourish. However, we do find evidence
that when the central bank conducts a policy focusing on exchange rate
stabilization, technical trading rules can generate superior returns when
applied at a sufficiently high frequency. This suggests that information
captured by technical trading rules during interventions are short-lived
and only valuable when applied accordingly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: section 1.2 de-
scribes the data. Section 1.3 reveals the implemented trading rules and
statistical tests, section 1.4 provides and discusses the results and section
1.5 concludes.
1.2 Data
To assess the profitability of technical trading rules in a favorable envi-
ronment, we collected a long time-span of tick-by-tick transaction data
of the second largest BRICS-currency (Bank of International Settlement,
2013), namely the Russian Ruble versus the US Dollar. This data was
gathered from the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX)2 and
spans the period from January 2000 till June 2011 as shown in figure
1.1. It contains information on date, time rounded to the nearest sec-
ond, price, Dollar-volume and Ruble-volume for every transaction. We
re-sample the tick data at a 10, 15, 30 and 60 minute frequency to ana-
lyze the trade-off between the short-lived value of information and higher
transaction costs due to more trading.
2MICEX is the largest exchange in Russia and Eastern Europe. For foreign
exchange, MICEX centralizes country-wide domestic RUB-USD trading on one single
platform. This platform has been jointly developed with Reuters and provides similar
trading features as for the Reuters or EBS (Electronic Brokerage Systems) trading
platform.
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Figure 1.1: Exchange rate RUB-USD
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This figure displays the value of 1 USD in RUB plotted on the y-axis in
log scale from 2000 till June 2011.
Additionally, the data contains information on the quoted spread and
therefore we can observe real transaction costs on a tick-by-tick basis.
While previous research rely on estimated transaction costs, we use real
transaction costs instead. Since the spread determines the profitability
of trading rules, we consider taking this time-varying character into ac-
count as essential. By using the observed spread we thus account for
intraday patterns in the spread, changes in market liquidity and varia-
tions in the spread across exchange rate regimes. The upper panel in
table 1.1 displays how the spread decreases over time while the lower
panel displays spread summary statistics across exchange rate regimes.
The spread is most tight for the dual currency band regime which lasted
from 2005 till 2010. The pre-2005 managed floating regime has a spread
that is almost twice as large as for the subsequent regimes which is at-
tributable to lower liquidity during that sample period.
1.3 Trading rules and test design
1.3.1 Technical trading rules
In line with literature, we test for the presence of technical trading rule
profitability based on two technical trading rules most popular among
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Table 1.2: Overview Technical Trading Rules Parameterizations
Panel A: Moving Average Parameters
Short term Lag 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 ... 98 98 99
Long term Lag 2 3 4 ... 100 3 4 ... 99 100 100
Panel B: RSI Parameters
Lower Bound 10 10 10 10 11 11 11 ... 40 40 40
Upper Bound 90 90 90 90 89 89 89 ... 60 60 60
Lag 2 3 ... 100 2 ... 100 ... 2 ... 100
This table presents the various trading rule parameterizations for the moving
average (Panel A) and the RSI (Panel B) trading rule.
practitioners (Taylor and Allen, 1992) and most widely investigated in
research (Park and Irwin, 2007). The first is one of the most popular in
practice while at the same also one of the most vastly tested in academic
research (Park and Irwin, 2007). In short, moving averages trading rules
provide buy (sell) signal whenever the short moving average crosses the
long moving average from below (above). The second applied popular
trading rule in practice is an oscillator called RSI (Park and Irwin, 2007).
The indicator values of the RSI swing between 0 and 100 and it is used
to pinpoint overbought and oversold periods for a given security. The
higher (lower) the current value of the RSI, the more it is overbought
(oversold). In total we apply 4950 moving average and 3069 RSI trading
rules as shown in table 1.2. We focus on these 2 trading rules since we
expect that their long lasting popularity among practitioners may be the
result of their sound performance.
1.3.2 Returns and transaction cost
In a next step, we calculate the trading rule returns as the logarithmic
difference of two consecutive trading prices possibly adjusted with the
current observed spread conditional on having a trading signal.
rk,t+1 = (ln [Pt+1 + hst+1 · Sk,t+1]− ln [Pt + hst · Sk,t]) ·Dk,t (1.1)
Where rk,t is the kth return at time t+1, Pt, the mid-price at time t,
hs the observed half spread, Sk,t is the trading rule’s (new) trading rule
signal to buy or sell, and Dk,t the kth (existing) trading rule trading
position at time t. This setting allows us to capture both the long run
market evolution that contributes to lower spreads as well as temporary
6
spread increases due to uncertainty or liquidity scarcity. Our research
employs recent and time-varying spread data on a less liquid and more
volatile exchange rate which stands in contrast to previous literature that
estimates transaction costs in the nineties for major currencies and con-
secutively employs fixed transaction costs ranging from 0.03% to 0.08%
(Bessembinder, 1994; Neely et al., 1997; Cheung and Chinn, 2001).
1.3.3 RC and SPA test
To accommodate for data snooping as a result of the various parame-
terizations (White, 2000; Harvey et al., 2016), we employ the “superior
predictive ability” test of Hansen (2005) which tests whether the best
trading rule has predictive power over a benchmark taking into account
the full universe of tested trading rules. This test is based on the “re-
ality check” test of White (2000). First, we calculate the performance
statistic, fk,t, as shown in equation 1.2, where bt represents the bench-
mark return at time t, to assess the hypothesis that the best trading rule
from the pool of various trading rules did not significantly outperform
the benchmark: H0 : maxk=1→L {E (fk)} ≤ 0.
fk,t = rk,t − bt (1.2)
Hansen (2005) argues that the p-values from the “reality check” test
of White (2000) are easily inflated by adding new poor models to the
universe of the tested models. Therefore, he modifies the test statistic
through studentization which enables comparison of the models in terms
of units of standard deviation.
TSPA = max
[
max
k=1→L
√
N · fk
σˆk
, 0
]
(1.3)
Additionally, he proposes to construct a data dependent null distri-
bution to ensure that the influence from the poor alternative models is
reduced. Hansen’s (2005) solution therefore compares the average return
over the benchmark to a certain threshold as shown in equation 1.5.
TSPAi = max
[
max
k=1→L
√
N · Zk,i
σˆk
, 0
]
(1.4)
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With
Zk,i = fk,i − hx
(
fk
)
(1.5)
Where hx equals either, hc,hl, or hu representing the consistent,
lower bound, and upper bound SPA p-values.
hc
(
fk
)
=
fkif fk ≥ −
√
σˆ2
k
N · 2 · log logN
0 if fk ≤ −
√
σˆ2
k
N · 2 · log logN
(1.6)
hl
(
fk
)
= max
(
0, fk
)
(1.7)
hu
(
fk
)
= 0 (1.8)
1.4 Results
We start our discussion with the results, as shown in table 1.3, based
on a zero return benchmark without incorporating any transaction costs
applying the SPA-test using a 1000 bootstraps and an average block
length of 53. From this table we can state that an increase in the trad-
ing frequency at which technical trading rules are performed has an
advantageous effect on both the realized return and on its significance.
In absence of transaction costs, we find that technical trading rules can
exploit the market’s incomplete and lagged information processing, es-
pecially in very short terms. Specifically, we find that at a 60-minute
trading frequency, the consistent p-values are significant at a 10% level of
significance for 5 out of 12 years. When we increase the trading frequency
up to 30-minute intervals, the number of significant values increase to
8 at a 10% significance level from which 4 remain even significant at
1% significance level. At 15-minute intervals, the results become even
stronger. In this case, technical trading rule returns have outperformed
the zero return benchmark in 9 out of 12 years. At the highest frequency,
a 10-minute trading frequency, again 9 out of 12 yearly results are sig-
nificantly positive at a 10% significance level. Moreover, the previous
result further improves in terms of a further reduction of the p-values.
Next to these results, we also find that in tendency the number of trans-
actions increases when the trading frequency is shortened. Therefore,
3This resembles to setting the parameter q equal to 0.2 in the stationary bootstrap
of Politis and Romano (1994). Our results remain robust when using alternative
average block lengths. Moreover, Sullivan et al. (1999) set q equal to 0.1 and perform
500 bootstraps, they report that their results are insensitive to the choice of the block
length parameter.
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the results could be biased and not representative for a real trading en-
vironment. To accommodate this problem, we apply transaction costs
gathered from the observed bid-ask spread in our subsequent analysis.
Overall we find that, incorporating the transaction costs deteriorate the
best trading rule return to a great extent, as shown in table 1.4. As ex-
pected, imposing transactions costs based on the quoted spread largely
reduces the trading rule returns. Specifically, we find at a 60-minute
trading frequency that the consistent p-values are significant at a 10%
level of significance for only 1 out of 12 years. When we increase the
frequency up to 30-minute intervals, the number of significant values in-
crease to 3 at 10% significance level, whereas on a 15-minute intervals,
the results deteriorate. In this case, only 2 technical trading rules are
found having significantly outperformed the zero return benchmark. At
the 10-minute trading level, the results improve again with a total of
4 significant trading rule returns. We conclude that the lack of incor-
porating transaction costs in our previous analysis mostly explains the
previous found increase in significant returns4. Overall, the results are
far less outspoken compared the analysis above. Our findings based on
the lower trading frequencies thus comply with Kuang et al. (2014) who
show that the profitability of technical trading rule returns for various
emerging FX markets are illusionary after taking into account trans-
action costs and data snooping biases. Nevertheless, in the case of the
highest trading frequency, we find that on occasion – from 2003 till 2007–
technical trading rules yield superior returns. This suggests that infor-
mation captured by technical trading rules are short-lived and are only
valuable when applied accordingly. Moreover, we find this result only
during times when the Russian central bank imposed a managed floating
regime and from 2005 onwards a dual-currency basket (Central Bank of
the Russian Federation, 2013) aimed at reducing the volatility of the
exchange rate. Taking these two findings together, our results comply
with the literature suggesting that central bank interventions may create
profit opportunities for technical trading rules (LeBaron, 1999; Saacke,
2002; Szakmary and Mathur, 1997), but only exploitable when trading
at a very high pace.
4We find similar results when assessing based on a buy-and-hold benchmark both
with and without adjustment for transaction costs.
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1.5 Conclusion
In our study we conclude that initially our results support the existence
opportunities for technical trading strategies in the most favorable set-
ting as suggested by literature (Park and Irwin, 2007). However by
revisiting the impact of transaction cost on technical trading rule prof-
its through the use of real, time-varying transaction costs, we find that
trading rule returns deteriorate and do not significantly outperform the
benchmark. Nevertheless, we do find some evidence that when the cen-
tral bank conducted a policy of stabilizing the exchange rate, technical
trading rules can generate superior returns when applied at a sufficiently
high trading frequency. This suggests that information captured by tech-
nical trading rules are short-lived and are only valuable when applied
accordingly.
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Chapter 2
Intraday Momentum in
FX Markets:
Disentangling Informed
Trading from Liquidity
Provision1
Journal of Financial Markets - In Press
2.1 Introduction
Market participants need time to interpret and react to new informa-
tion. Consequently, the dissemination of news potentially leaves room
for predictability over short horizons of time. Theoretically, participants’
trades are likely to be informative of future returns, given that they can
be expected to contain private information (Lyons, 1995).
A number of papers show that interdealer order flow in foreign ex-
change (FX) markets is indeed predictive of future returns. Payne (2003)
shows that trades carry information and have a substantial permanent
impact on prices. Similarly, Chordia et al. (2005) show that order flow
predicts future returns over the very short horizon. More recently, Chor-
dia et al. (2008) find that very short-term predictability is diminished
1This chapter is based on joint work with Gert Elaut (Ghent University) and
Michael Frömmel (Ghent University).
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when bid-ask spreads are narrower, indicating that liquidity enhances
market efficiency through increased arbitrage activity. This finding sug-
gests that liquidity also plays a role in the short-term predictability of
returns.
Although most of the above studies focus on very short horizons, Gao
et al. (2015) take a considerably longer perspective while staying in the
field of intraday high-frequency data. In particular, these authors inves-
tigate the predictability of a security’s first half-hour return on its last
half-hour return and find that the former positively predicts the latter.
This finding suggests that, in addition to predictability over very short
periods of time, there also appears to be predictability over consider-
ably longer periods of time during the trading day. To date, however,
no studies have empirically tested the likely drivers of this ‘intraday
momentum’.
Our contribution to the literature on FX microstructure is twofold.
First, by using a long sample of transaction-level FX market data at tick
frequency, we construct high-frequency measures of the likely drivers of
intraday momentum in the Ruble market. Using these measures, we
analyze whether intraday momentum is stronger on days with more in-
formed trading or when demand for liquidity is higher. These hypotheses
capture the likely explanations of how market participants’ behavior may
generate the observed intraday momentum effect.
For the RUB-USD FX market, and contrary to the results of Gao
et al. (2015) for the equity market, we do not find any evidence sup-
porting the idea that intraday momentum is the result of strategic in-
formed trading during the opening and closing of the trading session.
This finding is consistent with the earlier finding that informed traders
in the RUB-USD FX market mainly trade during the opening of the
trading sessions in the Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX)
(Menkhoff and Schmeling, 2010). Instead, our results for the Ruble
market indicate that opening half-hour returns positively predict clos-
ing half-hour returns on days when bid-ask spreads are high during the
opening half-hour. We hypothesize that high spreads are consistent with
higher levels of liquidity provision by some market participants follow-
ing heavy trading early in the morning. Taken together, our results lend
support to the argument that risk aversion to overnight holdings and
a potential disposition effect among liquidity-providing market partici-
pants drive intraday momentum in the Ruble market.
Second, our findings also contribute to a better understanding of
intraday momentum along several other dimensions. In particular, we
corroborate the finding of Gao et al. (2015) that the trading hours of the
non-major currency’s domestic market matter for intraday momentum.
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Although these authors observe a general lack of intraday momentum
in major currencies vis-à-vis the US Dollar when considering US trading
hours, they find some weak evidence of intraday momentum when they
determine implicit trading hours, based on increases in volume in inter-
national equity index futures. Our results for the RUB-USD currency
pair show that, by considering the explicit trading hours of the MICEX,
significant levels of intraday momentum are present. Clearly, the ex-
plicit nature of the trading hours helps to identify the relevant periods
over which intraday momentum occurs in this FX market. Finally, our
results also support the earlier observation that intraday momentum is
more pronounced during crisis periods.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section 2.2,
we provide an overview of the related literature and formulate the differ-
ent mechanisms that may drive intraday momentum. In Section 2.3, we
describe the data used for our empirical analysis. Section 2.4 outlines
the concept of intraday momentum and presents the methodology used
to measure the degree of informed trading and liquidity demand. Section
2.5 provides and discusses the results. We conclude in Section 2.6.
2.2 Motivation and Related Literature
Gao et al. (2015) suggest two potential mechanisms that may drive in-
traday momentum in financial markets. First, the intraday pattern can
be the result of liquidity provision by some market participants (e.g.,
day traders, market makers, etc.). With price dissemination being the
highest at the beginning of a trading session (Bloomfield et al., 2005)
– market participants react to macroeconomic news released overnight
before the start of the trading session – temporary imbalances may arise
when market participants react similarly to news. Day traders and mar-
ket makers may be motivated to take opposite positions to provide liq-
uidity to the market. However, although these traders may quickly close
out winning positions throughout the day, they may be more reluctant
to rapidly close out losing positions. However, the prospect of having
to hold positions overnight may convince traders and market makers to
close out the positions nonetheless. Gao et al. (2015) point to a disposi-
tion effect among (day) traders (Odean, 1998; Locke and Mann, 2005) to
motivate such asymmetric behavior. The risk management practices of
financial institutions, however, may similarly force traders to close out
positions before the end of the day. This behavior of (foreign exchange)
dealers’ oﬄoading undesired inventory has been widely documented in
the literature (Lyons, 1995; Bjønnes and Rime, 2005).
Second, intraday momentum is also theoretically consistent with the
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strategic behavior of informed traders. Theoretically, Kyle (1985) and
Admati and Pfleiderer (1988) argue that informed traders will time their
trades during high-volume periods to hide their information advantage
and to limit the price impact. Doing so will force informed traders to
trade in high-volume periods (see Bloomfield et al., 2005). Given the
well-known U-shape in intraday trading volume, the implication is that
they will trade at the beginning and near the end of the trading day.
If informed traders indeed place their trades during periods of heavy
trading and if their trading has a (permanent) price impact, then this
may also drive the observed predictability in intraday returns.
Both explanations are closely related to the existing FX microstruc-
ture literature that investigates the predictability of returns in FX mar-
kets. Research indicates that fundamentals, proxied with macroeco-
nomic variables, perform poorly in predicting future exchange rate move-
ments (e.g., Evans and Lyons, 1999); however, this is not the case for
order flow and liquidity. In particular, it is well founded that order flow
predicts returns over the very short term. For example, Payne (2003)
shows that market participants’ trades carry information and have a
substantial permanent impact on prices. Similarly, Chordia et al. (2005)
show that order flow predicts future returns over the very short horizon.
Theoretically, the predictability of future returns based on order
flow is consistent with strategic order splitting among informed traders.
Given that information among market participants is heterogeneous,
some participants are likely to participate in strategic trading to dis-
guise their superior information. One way to lower the impact of their
trades is through order splitting (Chakravarty, 2001), which results in
correlated trades.
Love and Payne (2008) show that there is short-term predictability
through order flow when public information is released, which suggests
that the predictability is driven by information processing. Simultane-
ously, Evans and Lyons (2005) show that FX markets incorporate news
only gradually, over the matter of a few days, rather than instanta-
neously. Similarly, Rime et al. (2010) confirm gradual learning and show
that order flow is a strong predictor for daily returns. The above liter-
ature indicates that both transitory and permanent price impacts seem
to be predictable from past order flow, at least over short horizons.
The recent literature has also started to consider that liquidity is an
important explanatory variable in the price discovery process. Chordia
et al. (2008) find that very short-term predictability is diminished when
bid-ask spreads are narrower, indicating that liquidity enhances market
efficiency through increased arbitrage activity. More recently, Boudt and
Petitjean (2014) show that changes in order imbalances are informative
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of price discovery. This finding suggests that liquidity also plays a role
in the short-term predictability of returns.
2.3 Data Description and Institutional Fea-
tures
2.3.1 Data
We use a particularly long-time span of intraday transaction-level data at
tick frequency on the Russian Ruble-United States Dollar (RUB-USD).
We obtain the data from the MICEX, the largest exchange in Russia
and Eastern Europe. Spot trading in the RUB-USD currency pair equals
1.66% of total FX spot trading volume in 2013, meaning that the cur-
rency pair ranks as the 12th mostly heavily traded globally.
The period for which we are able to obtain data covers the period
from January 12, 2005, to December 30, 2014. Although constrained
to one particular currency pair, the data set offers several advantages.
First, a long data span avoids a number of short sample problems that
researchers often encounter in the microstructure literature, such as pos-
sible structural breaks or biases in the estimated parameters. Second,
the sample period features both the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009
and the more recent Russian crisis of 2014, during which the Russian Ru-
ble was the object of the crisis. Figure 2.1 illustrates the evolution of
the RUB-USD exchange rate over the sample period.
Both the Global Financial Crisis and the Russian crisis are clearly
discernible, with both instances leading to a meaningful depreciation in
the value of the RUB versus the USD. The figure also suggests somewhat
higher volatility post-2008 compared to the first couple of years of the
sample period.
The MICEX trading platform was jointly developed with Reuters
and has features similar to the platform of Reuters or Electronic Bro-
kerage Systems (EBS). Participants can observe the price, the trading
volume, and the bid- and ask prices with standing volumes. In contrast
to most other FX markets, it is only possible to submit limit orders to
the platform. However, market orders can be synthetically created by
submitting marketable limit orders. The MICEX covers all domestic
spot trading in Russia. Offshore trading in the RUB-USD is performed
through and limited to non-deliverable forward contracts. To illustrate
the fact that both platforms are very similar and that the MICEX is
the main exchange for spot trading in RUB-USD worldwide, we note
that trading on Thomson Reuters is transmitted to the MICEX dur-
ing trading hours when the MICEX is open. We refer to Menkhoff and
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Figure 2.1: Evolution United States Dollar - Russian Ruble (2005-2014)
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This figure displays the value of 1 USD in RUB plotted on the
y-axis in log scale from January 2005 till December 2014.
Schmeling (2010) for further details on Ruble trading on the MICEX.
The data set contains the following information for every trade ex-
ecuted on the MICEX; a time-of-day time stamp (to the millisecond),
the price at which the order is executed, and the size of the trade. Si-
multaneously, we also have information on the best bid- and ask price
at the time every order is executed. From the transaction-level data,
we calculate half-hour (30 minutes) log returns for each trading day t as
follows:
rj,t = log
(
pj,t
pj−1,t
)
(2.1)
where rj,t represents the half-hour return at day t for intraday in-
terval j and pj,t represents the exchange rate at day t (the value of one
US Dollar quoted in Russian Rubles) at the end of intraday interval j.
The first half-hour return of each day is calculated based on the previous
day’s closing price. This way we also capture the overnight return com-
ponent, which might drive the informed trading and liquidity demand we
wish to analyze. At the same time, by using the previous day’s closing
price we avoid relying on the opening price. This is an important consid-
eration, since the opening price is prone to pricing errors that may bias
opening returns (see Amihud and Mendelson, 1987). Table 2.1 reports
the summary statistics for the first and last half-hour returns used in
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this paper. We report statistics both for the full sample period and for
the crisis periods separately.
We observe that opening half-hour returns are considerably more
variable than closing half-hour returns, which reflects information pro-
cessing at the start of the trading session. In addition, both return
series are negatively skewed, suggesting that large negative returns are
considerably more prevalent than large positive returns.
2.3.2 Institutional Features
The data set we consider has several features that we should bear in mind
before we continue. First, and particular to the MICEX, the exchange
has changed the opening and closing hour on several occasions over the
sample period. In all instances, the change in trading hours led to an
increase in the number of hours that the MICEX is open for trading.
Table 2.2 provides an overview of the changes in trading hours.
The changes in the number of trading hours imply that the amount
of time between the first half-hour return and the last half-hour return,
the returns of interest, is not constant throughout the sample period.
Because intraday momentum is expected to occur mainly during the start
and the end of the trading day, however, we expect that the phenomenon
is unaffected by the particular time of day with which the trading half-
hours correspond.
Second, we note that foreign exchange markets are generally con-
sidered to be open virtually around the clock, with at least one major
exchange trading the major currency pairs virtually at any point in time
during the week. As such, the notion of first half-hour and last half-hour
returns in the case of foreign exchange markets may seem inappropriate.
Although this is true, trading intensifies considerably when a currency’s
domestic financial market commences trading. Furthermore, returns,
spreads, and volatility are impacted by the market activity of various
financial centers (Andersen and Bollerslev, 1997). Therefore, it can be
argued that foreign exchange markets generally have implicit opening
and closing trading hours. In the case of our data set, trading in the
currency pair is organized during a fixed trading session, providing us
with explicit opening and closing hours.
Nonetheless, to the extent that market participants trade outside the
trading hours of the MICEX, this particular feature of the FX market
may work against finding intraday momentum. Simultaneously, both
explanations for intraday momentum crucially depend on liquidity con-
siderations. Thus, if the observed intraday momentum described above
is driven by the particular behavior of traders suggested by both ex-
planations, then they will likely trade between the trading hours of the
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Table 2.2: Overview Trading Sessions on the MICEX Exchange for the
RUB-USD
Period Opening Closing
01/01/2005 - 11/11/2008 10:00 14:00
12/11/2008 - 12/04/2013 10:00 15:00
13/04/2013 - 31/12/2014 10:00 17:00
Notes: trading hours in Moscow local time (GMT+3).
MICEX.
Finally, we should also briefly consider the particular institutional
circumstances implied by FX markets. It is well known that trading on
these markets is reserved to major banks and large institutional compa-
nies. This direct trading between major dealers covers the vast majority
of foreign exchange traded volume and is often referred to as the first tier
or wholesale tier. Our data set covers the trades executed on this whole-
sale tier market. Retail investors, mutual funds, and large non-financial
corporations are, however, not directly active on this tier. Instead, these
investors transact bilaterally with banks or brokers who provide quotes.
Depending on the inventories of the banks and brokers with which these
investors transact, these investors’ orders may or may not be passed on
to the wholesale tier. This particular market structure implies that re-
tail investors will only indirectly impact the foreign exchange market.
As such, it is ultimately the manner in which market makers pass the
resulting inventory changes to the wholesale tier that matters. We can
imagine that, if the liquidity needs of investors in the retail tier are large
enough to materially impact the inventories of the market makers, then
the effect will propagate to the trading on the wholesale tier. Despite
this intricacy that follows from the two-tier structure of foreign exchange
markets, we note that trading on the wholesale tier strongly outweighs
trading on the retail tier. The forces driving intraday momentum can
be at play between participants in the wholesale tier, and we directly
observe (the price impact of) this trading.
From the above discussion, we can conclude that the particular struc-
ture of FX markets does not, a priori, rule out the possibility of intraday
momentum in foreign exchange markets, although some features can be
expected to work against observing an intraday momentum effect.
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2.4 Methodology
To determine the existence of intraday momentum, we closely follow the
approach used by Gao et al. (2015) and estimate predictive regressions.
These authors note that the predictive regressions correspond to AR
models. Although this is true, changes to the trading hours by the
MICEX over the sample period imply that, in our case, the exact lag
length of the AR model varies over time (see Section 2.3). We therefore
express the predictive regression as follows:
rl,t = α+ βrf,t + t (2.2)
where rf,t is the first half-hour return and rl,t is the last half-hour
return. We also consider the predictive value of the penultimate return,
which we denote as rsl,t. The inclusion of this term allows us to control
for any short-term persistence in the exchange rate during the day and
to isolate the predictive value of the last half-hour return.
To investigate the relationship between informed trading and in-
traday momentum, we construct the Dynamic Probability of Informed
Trading (DPIN) suggested by Chang et al. (2014). This measure builds
on the empirical work of Avramov et al. (2006) and Campbell et al. (1992)
and allows us to measure the degree of informed versus uniformed trading
based on high-frequency transaction-level data. More specifically, this
approach allows us to measure and track the presence of informed trades
throughout the trading day on a high frequency. The fact that financial
markets are becoming increasingly computer-driven – potentially making
private information increasingly short-lived – makes measuring informed
trading at the intraday increasingly important. The approach of Chang
et al. (2014) allows us to avoid a degradation to lower frequencies of the
PIN measure originally proposed by Easley et al. (1997).
Following Chang et al. (2014), we first perform a regression to isolate
the unexpected half-hour return component (t) from the return series
while controlling for day-of-the-week effects (using the dummy variables
denoted as Ddayj ), time-of-day-effects (using the dummy variables de-
noted as Dintj ), and lagged half-hour returns (rt−k)2:
rt = α0 +
4∑
i=1
α1i ·Ddayi +
J∑
j=1
α2j ·Dintj +
12∑
k=1
α3k · rt−k + t (2.3)
Autocorrelation patterns in unexpected returns (or a lack thereof)
indicate the presence of uninformed (informed) trading. In particular,
2Where J equals the amount of intraday 30-minute intervals in the specific period.
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Avramov et al. (2006) note that trades that take liquidity generate (fu-
ture) price reversals. At the same time, sell trades in the presence of pos-
itive unexpected returns do not exhibit any autocorrelation and therefore
indicate informed trading. Chang et al. (2014) argue that this can be
extended to buy trades. The authors point out that buy trades in the
presence of negative unexpected returns do not exhibit any autocorre-
lation, which again implies informed trading. Following (Chang et al.,
2014) our measure of informed trading is calculated as follows:
DPINt =
NBt
NTt
· (t < 0) + NSt
NTt
· (t > 0) (2.4)
where NBt, NSt, and NTt are the number of buy, sell, and total
trades made during the half-hour interval, respectively, from t to t − 1
and (t < 0) and (t > 0) are sign indicators that equal one when the
unexpected return is smaller and larger than zero, respectively, and zero
otherwise.
To analyze the alternative explanation, i.e., whether liquidity provi-
sion to some extent drives intraday momentum, we require a measure
that identifies the trading days in which market participants can be
expected to have provided liquidity to the market. For purposes of anal-
ysis, we focus on the tightness dimension of liquidity (Kyle, 1985). This
is the main dimension of liquidity and is measured using the Equal-
Weighted Quoted Spread (EWQS). This metric measures the average
bid-ask spread over a given period of time. We hypothesize that, on
days where the EWQS was higher during the first half-hour, more liq-
uidity was demanded by market participants (e.g., as a consequence of
economic news that was released overnight), meaning that some day
traders or market makers are more likely to have provided the required
liquidity.
2.5 Results
2.5.1 Intraday Momentum in RUB-USD
We start by running a set of predictive regressions in the spirit of Gao
et al. (2015). In particular, we explore whether the first half-hour return,
the penultimate half-hour return, and a combination of both independent
variables are able to predict the last half-hour return. The results are
reported in Table 2.3.
The results for the entire sample, reported in Panel A, indicate that
there is no significant relationship between the last half-hour return and
the first half-hour return. Although the coefficient has the expected sign,
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it is not significant at conventional levels, with a p-value of 0.12. The
results for the penultimate half-hour return are similar, although the
relationship appears to be even weaker. When we include both intraday
returns in the predictive regression, however, the coefficient on the first
half-hour return becomes significant at conventional levels, albeit only at
the 10% level3. These results, although suggestive, are somewhat thin.
Second, we examine whether the relationship differs in periods of
financial stress. We classify the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and
the Russian crisis of 2014 as periods of financial distress. The results,
reported in Panel B and Panel C of Table 2.3, indicate that intraday
momentum is considerably more pronounced during periods of financial
stress. During non-crisis periods, however, the relationship does not
appear significant. This finding is consistent with the findings of Gao
et al. (2015), who find that intraday momentum is more pronounced
during the 2007-2009 Global Financial Crisis.
Third, to test the predictive ability of intraday momentum out-of-
sample (OOS), we also perform out-of-sample forecasts. In particular,
we run the above predictive regression with expanding windows, adding
one day at a time. Using the estimated coefficients of the predictive
regression (denoted using hats) and the value of the predictive variable
at time s, we predict the return at time s+ 1:
rˆl,s+1 = αˆ+ βˆrf,s (2.5)
We perform these estimations for s = s0, ..., t − 1, thus generating
a time series of out-of-sample return forecasts. s0 is the initial sample
size used to estimate the model (in our application, 4 years). We then
estimate the OOS R2 to measure out-of-sample predictability:
OOS R2 = 1−
1
T−s0
∑T−1
s=s0 (rl,s+1 − rˆl,s) 2
1
T−s0
∑T−1
s=s0 (rl,s+1 − r¯l,s) 2
, (2.6)
where r¯l,s is the historical mean of the last half-hour return, calcu-
lated from the expanding window of last half-hour returns. To test the
significance of the OOS R2, we employ the F -statistic of McCracken
(2007). In Table 2.4, we report the results for the OOS R2.
Similarly to Gao et al. (2015), we obtain a significant OOS R2 of
approximately 1.6%. This level of OOS R2 is very substantial compared
3One potential reason could be microstructural issues such as bid-ask bounces,
which cause intraday returns to exhibit mean-reverting behavior over short intervals.
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Table 2.4: Out-Of-Sample Predictability
OOS R2 MSE-F
rf 1.609% 21.948***
rsl -0.086% -1.151
rf and rsl 1.640% 22.371***
This table examines the out-of-sample predictability of the last half-
hour by the first half hour return and the second-to-last half-hour re-
turn, using a set of recursive regressions. The initial sample period (s0)
is 4 years (2005-2008).
Asterisks indicate statistical significance of the OOS R2 using the MSE-
F test
MSE − F = (T − s0)
(
MSEm −MSEp
MSEp
)
.
Asymptotic critical values for the MSE test provided by McCracken
(2007) used to test significance.
Statistical significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level given by *, **,
and ***, respectively.
to other works (e.g., Campbell and Thompson, 2008; Ferreira and Santa-
Clara, 2011). Simultaneously, the penultimate return does not seem to
have any out-of-sample predictive power.
A second method of testing the economic significance of the results
is by analyzing the returns accruing to a strategy that uses signals based
on the first half-hour return. Here, we also closely follow Gao et al.
(2015). We take a long or short position at the beginning of the final
half-hour period, depending on the return of the opening half-hour, and
close out the position at the end of the trading day. We benchmark
the performance of this strategy to a constant long strategy that always
goes long at the beginning of every final half-hour and that closes out
the position at the end of every trading day4.
The results in Table 2.5 indicate that, at least for the full sample
period, the market timing strategy does not outperform the always long
strategy. Interestingly, however, the returns to the intraday momen-
tum strategy are positively skewed. This finding is in contrast to the
always long series which, similar to the original first and last half-hour
returns, is strongly negatively skewed. The disappointing performance
of the strategy over the full sample matches the earlier observation that
4We note that the returns to both strategies are comparable because both strate-
gies have identical turnover and thus incur similar levels of transactions costs.
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Table 2.5: Performance Intraday Momentum Market Timing Strategy
Intraday Momentum Strategy Full Sample Crises
Mean return 0.001% 0.009%
Sharpe 0.426 2.637
Skewness 5.196 7.279
Kurtosis 137.582 131.327
Success rate 49.530% 51.410%
Always Long Strategy Full sample Crises
Mean return 0.004% 0.004%
Sharpe 1.261 1.124
Skewness -5.413 -7.060
Kurtosis 138.342 132.897
Success rate 52.135% 51.193%
This table reports summary statistics on the performance
of a market timing strategy based on intraday momen-
tum and an always-long trading strategy. The market
timing strategy goes long when the first half-hour return
is positive, and short otherwise. The always-long strat-
egy always goes long the last half-hour of the trading
day. The results are reported for the full sample and for
the crisis periods. We report the mean daily return, the
(annualized) Sharpe ratio, skewness, kurtosis, and the
success rate.
intraday momentum appears to be more pronounced during crises.
When we restrict the sample to the crisis periods, the strategy per-
forms particularly well. The strategy posts a higher return, a higher
Sharpe ratio, and a higher success rate than the always long strategy.
Interestingly, the returns to the intraday momentum strategy are again
positively skewed, whereas the always long strategy exhibits negative
skewness. As such, the intraday momentum trading strategy appears to
limit downside risk.
Overall, these findings suggest that, although this fairly naïve strat-
egy does not generate attractive returns overall, the strategy does appear
to generate attractive returns in bad market states.
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2.5.2 Informed Trading versus Liquidity Provision
Having established the presence of intraday momentum in the RUB-USD
market, we explore the likely drivers of intraday momentum outlined in
the introduction. As a starting point, we first analyze how volume is
distributed over the trading day. We can expect informed traders to
execute their trades around the opening and closing of the trading day
to take advantage of increased volume and liquidity, if we observe high
trading volume in the morning and a pick-up in trading volume again
towards the end of the trading day. To investigate whether this is the
case, we report the average 30-minute trading volume (in US Dollars)
for the different trading hour regimes in Figure 2.25.
The figure suggests that volume, on average, does not exhibit a U-
shape, as is typical in equity markets (see, e.g., Jain and Joh, 1988).
Simultaneously, the box plots indicate that there is nevertheless consid-
erable time series variation in the volume traded during every half-hour
of trading. The fact that the RUB-USD market does not exhibit a U-
shaped distribution in volume over the trading day has an important
implication for the ‘informed trading hypothesis’. This observation sug-
gests that, although we find intraday momentum, informed trading may
not be the main driver because there is generally no reason for informed
traders to postpone their trading to the last half-hour of the trading
day. This idea is consistent with the finding of Menkhoff and Schmeling
(2010), who, using a short sample of data on the MICEX that includes
anonymized trader identifiers, find that informed traders mainly trade
during the opening of the trading sessions in the MICEX. Naturally, in-
formed traders may have other considerations in addition to the trading
volume for spreading trades over the trading day.
To formally analyze the relationship between intraday momentum,
informed trading, and liquidity demand, we estimate several model spec-
ifications. To be concise, we focus on the crisis periods, for which we find
intraday momentum to be most pronounced6. For purposes of compar-
ison, in column (1) of Table 2.6, we first repeat the baseline predictive
regression of interest.
In Table A.2 of the Appendix, we observe that intraday momentum is
related to the realized volatility and trading volume over the first half-
hour of trading7. To control for both effects, we include the realized
5For completeness, we report similar figures for DPIN and EWQS in the Ap-
pendix.
6The results for the full sample, reported in Table A.1 of the Appendix, remain
qualitatively the same.
7Gao et al. (2015) show that intraday momentum is positively associated with
volume and volatility. In Table A.2 of the Appendix, we repeat their analysis and
find that intraday momentum is positively associated with volume and volatility.
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Table 2.6: Disentangling Liquidity and Informed trading During Crises
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Variables rl rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0656** 0.0608** 0.0954* 0.0071 0.0368
(0.031) (0.025) (0.051) (0.017) (0.037)
rsl -0.2271 -0.2467 -0.2299 -0.2458 -0.2338
(0.178) (0.168) (0.144) (0.162) (0.142)
DL(DPIN) · rf -0.0447 -0.0354
(0.059) (0.056)
DH(DPIN) · rf -0.0756 -0.0765
(0.056) (0.054)
DL(EWQS) · rf 0.0136 0.0214
(0.027) (0.027)
DH(EWQS) · rf 0.0642* 0.0671**
(0.036) (0.031)
Opening σ2RV -0.0955 -0.0941 -0.0925 -0.0902
(0.078) (0.070) (0.075) (0.067)
Opening log(V olume) -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002 0.0002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 922 922 922 922 922
R2(%) 15.7 19.0 21.7 20.2 23.0
This table presents regression results for the sub-sample that covers both
periods of financial distress, i.e. the financial crisis of 2007-2009 and the
Russian crisis of 2014. Column (1) regresses the closing half-hour return
(rl) on the first half-hour return (rf ) and the second last half-hour return
(rsl). In column (2), we control for volume and realized volatility during
the first half-hour of trading. Column (3) evaluates the impact of informed
trading on the closing half-hour return. In column (4) we measure the
impact of liquidity on the closing half-hour return. Finally, in column (5)
we combine both specifications.
Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors in parenthesis. Significance
at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
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volatility during the first half-hour and the (common log of) volume as
controls in column (2). Controlling for volume and realized volatility,
we observe no change in the sign, magnitude, or significance of the esti-
mated coefficients. For completeness, we report the pairwise correlations
between the variables of interest in Table A.3. of the Appendix8.
Turning to the other specifications, column (3) reports the specifi-
cation that analyzes the relationship between intraday momentum and
periods of low and high levels of informed trading. In particular, we con-
struct a set of dummy variables that equal 1 depending on whether the
level of informed trading during the first half-hour is in the top (DH),
middle, or bottom (DL) tercile, respectively. We then interact these
dummy variables with the observed return during the first half-hour of
trading, omitting the middle tercile to serve as the baseline. The coeffi-
cients on the interaction terms in column (3) suggest that the predictive
relationship is not significantly stronger during periods of above-average
or below-average levels of informed trading in the first half-hour of the
trading day.
Column (4) analyzes the alternative hypothesis, which relates intra-
day momentum to liquidity provision by day traders during the start of
the trading session. Similar to the case of informed trading, we divide
all trading days into three different terciles, depending on the value of
the EWQS over the opening half-hour interval. We hypothesize that
higher-than-average quoted spreads during the first half-hour of trading
are indicative of higher levels of liquidity demand, requiring liquidity
provision by some other market participants.
All else being equal, higher quoted spreads can also be the result
of high volatility. However, because we include the realized volatility
over the first half-hour of trading as a control variable, the regression
specification should control for this effect and allow us to better isolate
the impact of liquidity provision following strong liquidity demand. In
this regression, we also interact the resulting dummy variables with the
first half-hour return. Interestingly, we find that the first half-hour re-
turn becomes insignificant. Instead, the interaction term that interacts
the first half-hour return with the dummy in periods of high quoted
spreads becomes positive and significantly so. This finding suggests that
intraday momentum is the result of high liquidity demand by market
participants during the opening combined with dealers’ risk aversion to
overnight inventory. Finally, we control for the level of informed trad-
ing; see column (5). Menkhoff and Schmeling (2010) find that informed
8The pairwise correlation between the equal-weighted quoted spread and the dy-
namic probability of informed trading is high (0.69). However, the coefficients for the
specifications in which we omit one of the two variables (cfr. infra) do not change
meaningfully (see Table A.3), suggesting that multicollinearity is not an issue.
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traders in MICEX tend to trade when spreads are higher, implying that
we need to control for the level of informed trading.
Interestingly, controlling for informed trading, we find that the rela-
tionship becomes even more pronounced from a statistical perspective.
This result suggests that intraday momentum tends to occur during trad-
ing days when quoted spreads are high, even when controlling for the
potential effect of informed trading on spreads. We interpret this finding
as supportive of the hypothesis that intraday momentum is to a certain
extent driven by a high liquidity demand during the morning combined
with a strong risk aversion to overnight holdings potentially driven by
risk management policies, the disposition effect or habits among market
makers.
Are there institutional circumstances that may explain why intraday
momentum in the Ruble market appears to be the result of liquidity
provision, rather than informed trading? The main differences between
foreign exchange and other financial markets are the sheer size of FX
markets and the fact that these markets are only accessible by major
dealers. We can imagine that, because the FX market is considerably
larger in terms of notional value, informed trading is less likely to impact
prices. Simultaneously, however, if a sufficiently large fraction of the
market’s participants reacts similarly to a news announcement, then
liquidity demand can be expected to meaningfully impact prices (albeit
temporarily)9.
Second, the results suggest that the traders who provided liquidity
to these early trades close their positions and thus take exactly the same
direction as the information-driven trades at the start of the day. Be-
cause these traders mirror the information-based trades in the morning,
what is their motivation and why do they not adjust their behavior?
We note that microstructure theory suggests that the bid-ask spread
consists of three components: an order processing component, an adverse
9A second reason why liquidity may be the prime driver of intraday momen-
tum is the following. Informed traders attempt to hide their informational advan-
tage through splitting large orders (Chordia and Subrahmanyam, 2004) into several
smaller, medium-sized transactions (Chakravarty, 2001). Thus, their trading will
be geared towards avoiding a meaningful price impact. To the extent that traders
are successful at hiding their informational advantage, we will not observe any in-
traday momentum. Moreover, although excess inventories require trading near the
end of the trading day, the informed trading hypothesis provides no rationale for
informed traders to always trade in both the morning and the afternoon. Because in-
formed traders want to monetize their informational advantage as quickly as possible
(Bloomfield et al., 2005), it is less likely that they will want to wait until the end of
the trading day, especially, in markets as deep as FX markets. Moreover, earlier work
using the same data on the same market concludes that FX traders on the MICEX
mainly trade during the opening session through medium-sized orders (Menkhoff and
Schmeling, 2010).
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selection component, and an inventory holding component (Huang and
Stoll, 1997). Changes in the spread, in this case, are likely to be driven
by changes in the latter two components10.
One reason why the intraday pattern, if it is indeed driven by liq-
uidity provision during the opening session, may continue to exist is the
following. We can assume that, when market makers set their prices,
they will most likely take into consideration the ease with which they
will be able to eliminate the position again. As such, a market maker
will be willing to provide liquidity provided that the premium (i.e., the
inventory holding component) received is higher than the likely cost of
having to liquidate the position again later that day. In other words, the
profit from providing liquidity during the first half-hour should offset the
expected loss from forced liquidation later that trading day. This may
explain why the effect persists and why traders who generate the effect
continue to survive.
2.5.3 Robustness Checks
We now present the results of additional regressions to test the robust-
ness of the intraday momentum effect on several dimensions. In particu-
lar, we analyze whether the effect is robust across different subsamples,
different return sampling frequencies, alternative definitions of liquidity,
and changes in the estimation method.
2.5.3.1 Subsample Analysis
We repeat the analysis for both crisis periods separately. If intraday
momentum in the RUB-USD market is indeed primarily a crisis phe-
nomenon, we expect to observe a significant relationship during both
crisis periods identified above. We report the results for the Global Fi-
nancial Crisis of 2007-2009 and the Russian crisis of 2014 in Panels A
and B of Table 2.7, respectively.
Although the relationship is significant in both instances, intraday
momentum appears to be especially pronounced during the Russian crisis
of 2014. This finding should not come as a surprise, given that the
Russian Ruble was to a large extent the object of the crisis. This was not
10The order processing component refers to market makers’ fixed costs. The ad-
verse selection component compensates the market maker in cases when he or she
is trading against a counterparty who may have superior information. For example,
aggressive (market) orders may indicate that the counterparty has private informa-
tion and thus may motivate the market maker to increase the spread. Finally, the
inventory holding component refers to a premium that the market maker requires for
providing liquidity during periods of unbalanced flows.
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Table 2.8: Robustness Check - Sensitivity of Intraday Momentum to the
Return Frequency
rf/rl 60m 30m 15m
60m 0.0457** 0.0667* 0.0245*
30m 0.0513** 0.0698* 0.0269**
15m 0.0214 0.0330* 0.0273**
This table presents regression results for the return frequency
sensitivity analysis. The coefficients for the specification under
Eq. (2) for alternative opening and closing return frequencies
are displayed.
Significance using Newey and West (1987)standard errors at 1%,
5%, and 10% level are indicated by ***, **, and *, respectively.
the case during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007-2009, where equity
and credit markets played the leading part.
2.5.3.2 Choice of the Return Frequency
The use of half-hour returns strictly follows earlier work on intraday
momentum in financial markets. However, this usage leaves unanswered
the question of whether the peak of momentum predictability indeed
is situated around this particular frequency. A natural question that
arises is whether the observed intraday momentum is robust to the use
of different frequencies11. To test whether intraday momentum is sensi-
tive to the frequency and whether half-hour returns are the peak of the
observed predictability, we re-run the regression in Eq. (1) for different
combinations of return frequencies. In particular, we perform K × K
regressions to analyze all potential combinations of the first and final
15-minute, half-hour, and one-hour returns. We report the coefficients
of interest in Table 2.8.
We find that intraday momentum is robust to the frequency em-
ployed. In particular, the price action at the start of the trading day
is predictive of the price evolution near the end of the trading day, and
the relationship is robust to the particular interval chosen. In economic
terms, the effect is strongest for opening half-hour returns on closing
half-hour returns.
Next, we analyze the robustness of the main results to a change in
frequency. Because both proposed mechanisms that may drive intraday
momentum can be expected to be at play especially during the very start
11We thank an anonymous referee for calling attention to this point.
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and end of the trading session, we re-run the main analysis, calculating
all variables of interest over the first 15 minutes of trading, and try to
predict the return during last 15 minutes of the trading session. The
first column of Table 2.9 reports the results.
Our findings continue to hold, indicating that the mechanism that
drives intraday momentum is at play at the very start of the trading
session.
2.5.3.3 Alternative Liquidity Measures
Next, we assess the robustness of our main results to different measures
of liquidity. To that end, we repeat the specifications in Table 2.6 using
several alternative measures of liquidity that we can construct from the
data we have at our disposal. First, we turn to the Effective Spread
(ES) as the liquidity metric. The result is shown in column (2) of Table
2.9 and confirms our baseline results and the results described above.
In particular, we continue to find that liquidity appears to be the main
driver of intraday momentum in the RUB-USD FX market.
Second, we replace the EWQS variable from our baseline analy-
sis with the Volume-Weighted Quoted Spread (VWQS). This measure
weights the bid-ask spreads by the volume of trades, and therefore, it
takes into consideration the size of the trade matching the observed bid
and ask prices. We report the result in column (3) of Table 2.9. Here
too, we find that the intraday momentum effect is stronger when bid-ask
spreads are high during the opening half-hour interval.
2.5.3.4 Estimation method
The estimations we have performed so far are based on OLS. Return se-
ries, however, tend to exhibit volatility clustering, which, from a statis-
tical perspective, induces heteroscedasticity. In addition, high-frequency
data often exhibit significant levels of negative autocorrelation over very
short intervals (Roll, 1984) and positive autocorrelation over slightly
longer intervals. Some of these patterns are the result of microstructure-
related issues such as the bid-ask bounce, whereas others follow from the
fact that information processing takes time (see Chordia et al., 2005).
Using Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors, we have so far
accounted for such effects on the estimation results.
Nonetheless, because we do not know the full shape of the distribu-
tion of the data, we re-estimate the main results using the Generalized
Method of Moments (GMM). Although the moments we impose are iden-
tical to the moments under OLS, a two-step GMM allows us to efficiently
estimate the model when we face heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation
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Table 2.9: Robustness Check - Alternative Definitions and Estimation
Method
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variables rl rl rl rl
rf 0.0031 0.0507 0.0418 0.0368
(0.019) (0.036) (0.038) (0.036)
rsl -0.0826 -0.2285 -0.2312 -0.2338*
(0.088) (0.143) (0.142) (0.141)
DL(DPIN) · rf 0.0035 -0.0413 -0.0346 -0.0354
(0.020) (0.058) (0.055) (0.055)
DH(DPIN) · rf -0.0307 -0.0743 -0.0763 -0.0765
(0.027) (0.055) (0.054) (0.054)
DL(EWQS) · rf 0.0193 0.0214
(0.019) (0.027)
DH(EWQS) · rf 0.0398** 0.0671**
(0.018) (0.031)
DL(ES) · rf 0.0165
(0.037)
DH(ES) · rf 0.0491*
(0.027)
DL(VWQS) · rf 0.0049
(0.027)
DH(VWQS) · rf 0.0623**
(0.030)
Opening σ2RV -0.0827* -0.0919 -0.0902 -0.0902
(0.047) (0.069) (0.067) (0.067)
Opening log(V olume) -0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Intercept 0.0003 0.0002 0.0002 0.0000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 922 922 922 922
R2(%) 11.3 22.2 23.0
This table reports the results for a number of robustness checks. Column (1)
reports the results of the main specification using an alternative return frequency
of 15-minutes for the first- and last half-hour return. Column (2) presents the
results using the effective spread as a measure of liquidity. Column (3) similarly
presents the results using the Volume-Weighted Quoted Spread as a liquidity
measure. Finally, column (4) reports the results obtained from estimation of the
main specification using two-step GMM.
Newey and West (1987) robust standard errors in parenthesis in column (1)
through (3). Significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level indicated by ***, **, and
*, respectively. 39
of an unknown form. We report the result in the final column of Table
2.9. The result indicates that our findings are robust to the particular
estimation method employed.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we use a long sample of transaction-level data at tick fre-
quency on the Russian Ruble-US Dollar currency pair from the MICEX
to investigate the likely drivers of intraday momentum in this FX market.
We contribute to the emerging literature of momentum at the in-
traday level in several ways. First, we find no evidence that intraday
momentum in the Ruble market is the result of market participants’
strategic trading during high-volume periods. Two observations moti-
vate this conjecture. First, there is no reason for informed traders in
the Ruble market to postpone trading until the last half-hour of trad-
ing, given that volume in the market does not exhibit a U-shape intraday
pattern. This is consistent with earlier work by Menkhoff and Schmeling
(2010), who find that informed traders on this particular market mainly
trade during the opening of the trading session. Second, we do not
find a stronger intraday momentum pattern on days with more informed
trading in the first half-hour of trading.
Instead, we find evidence that closing half-hour returns are positively
related to opening half-hour returns on days when spreads in the Ruble
market are high during the opening half-hour. These high spreads are
consistent with a strong liquidity demand by market participants in the
first half-hour of trading. This finding lends support to the argument
that dealers and other liquidity providers in the Ruble market are trying
to oﬄoad unwanted inventories (Lyons, 1995;Bjønnes and Rime, 2005)
due to their risk aversion to overnight holdings. This interpretation
is consistent with the empirical finding of Bjønnes et al. (2005), who
show that non-financial customers are the main liquidity providers in
the overnight foreign exchange market.
Second, we provide additional evidence that corroborates the finding
of Gao et al. (2015) that explicit trading hours matter for intraday mo-
mentum. The particular nature of the RUB-USD FX market, a currency
pair for which spot trading is only possible on the MICEX, provides a
unique case where FX trading is subject to explicit trading hours. Fi-
nally, our results lend further support to the finding that intraday mo-
mentum is more pronounced during crises.
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of Volume (in US Dollars) over the Trading Day
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Chapter 3
The Components of
Interdealer Spot FX
Bid-Ask Spreads during
Periods of Calmness,
Crisis, and Interventions1
3.1 Introduction
There is a wide body of literature dealing with the estimation of bid-ask
spreads of securities (Roll, 1984; Glosten, 1987) and their decomposition
into various components. Several likely components of bid-ask spreads
have been brought forward. First, the literature stresses the impor-
tance of the order processing component. This component serves to
compensate market participants for costs incurred (e.g. wages, rent, IT-
infrastructure) needed in order to handle the transaction. Second, early
(theoretical) models on spread decomposition (Stoll, 1978; Amihud and
Mendelson, 1980) highlight the presence of dealers and potential strate-
gies they use to optimize their inventory of securities. These models bring
forward the inventory holding component in the spread. This compo-
nent serves as a means of protecting against holding unwanted amounts
of inventory and as a compensation for tying up capital. Third, other
(theoretical) models focus on the information content of trades (Kyle,
1This chapter is based on joint work with Michael Frömmel (Ghent University).
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1985; Glosten and Milgrom, 1985; Easley and O’Hara, 1987). As such,
this strand of the literature brings forth a third element referred to as
the adverse selection component, that compensates liquidity providers
from being picked off by more informed market participants.
Much of the theoretical work on spread decomposition models is
based on the particular structure of the New York Stock Exchange
(henceforth, NYSE) (Glosten and Harris, 1988; Huang and Stoll, 1997).
The NYSE is built around specialists (market makers) who create a
market by providing quotes – bid and ask prices – to other market par-
ticipants. As such, the NYSE is a quote-driven market. Models analyz-
ing such a market structure stress the importance of dealers’ inventory
management and behavior. In contrast, the foreign exchange market
differs radically from quote-driven markets since it has a decentralized
structure and is more opaque. More specifically, while the quote-driven
market still largely applies to the second tier of the foreign exchange
market in which clients trade bilaterally with their dealers providing
quotes, this is not the case for the first tier. Yet, the first tier lies at
the heart of how foreign exchange markets are structured. It is this tier
that covers the vast majority of FX trading volume (Lyons et al., 2001)
and where dealers trade directly with each other, either bilaterally or
indirectly (e.g. voice brokerage) or via electronic brokers (i.e. EBS limit
order book).
In this paper, we employ data that corresponds to trading on the first
tier of the Russian Ruble-US Dollar (henceforth RUB-USD) foreign ex-
change market. The interdealer RUB-USD market is facilitated through
an electronic platform in which dealers place limit or marketable limit
orders to the electronic trading platform. These orders then jointly form
the limit order book. As such, this interdealer market is quite central-
ized. All the bid and ask quotes, transactions, volume, and order flow
are visible to market participants that have direct access to the Moscow
Interbank Exchange (MICEX) platform. Given these market charac-
teristics, we rely on the modified decomposition model of McGroarty
et al. (2007). In their model, they assume that informed traders are set-
ting prices through limit orders (Bloomfield et al., 2005; Goettler et al.,
2009) instead of actively exploiting superior information through mar-
ket orders. This spread decomposition model modifies the established
spread decomposition model of Huang and Stoll (1997) in their baseline
assumption of how information is incorporated into the observed price
which makes the model better suited for order-driven markets. We con-
tribute to the existing literature in at least three ways. First, we are
the first to apply a modified version - adjusted to order-driven markets -
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of a well-established model to the first tier of an emerging FX market2.
Second, due to data availability issues as a consequence of the nature
of high frequency, the analysis in previous literature is limited to a few
days or months at most. We in contrast are able to analyze the spread
components over a period of almost five years, which allows us to exam-
ine the time variation. Third, recent developments, namely the recent
Russian currency crisis, enable us to observe how spreads and spread
components evolve and how they are affected during periods of market
stress. Given the particular nature of our emerging market data set, we
expect the adverse selection component to contribute considerably. Fur-
thermore, we expect that the adverse selection component increases in
periods of turmoil like the Russian Ruble currency crisis in 2014. Our re-
sults indicate that a significant part of the bid-ask spread (approximately
45%) compensates market participants against adverse selection. At the
same time, the relative importance of the adverse selection component
seems to decrease over time. This indicates more widespread informa-
tion and lower uncertainty due to better market coverage. During the
Russian crisis of 2014, we observe market participants asking a higher
compensation (in absolute terms) against adverse selection. At the same
time, the relative importance of the adverse selection component of the
bid-ask spread does not increase during crisis periods. This appears to
be neither the case for the full year, nor within the year. As for the
(temporary) buy-sell order imbalance component (inventory holding),
we find this to be a significant part of the spread (19%), albeit smaller
compared to the adverse selection component. The relative importance
of the buy-sell order imbalance component also seems to be declining
year on year, with the notable exception of the Russian crisis in 2014.
Especially, during the last two months of 2014 – when the crisis reached
a peak – we observe a strong increase in the order imbalance component.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In section 2 we
describe the data used for our empirical analysis. Section 3 presents the
applied methodology for decomposing the spreads. Section 4 provides
and discusses the results. We conclude in section 5.
2Russian Ruble-United States Dollar exchange rate which corresponds to the
second most important BRICS-currency representing about 1.6% and 1.1% of total
FX trading volume in 2013 and 2016 respectively (BIS, 2016).
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3.2 Data
3.2.1 Data description
We collect data on the first tier of an emerging foreign exchange mar-
ket, in which dealers can submit limit- or marketable limit orders to a
centralized trading platform. More specifically, we use unique, intraday
tick-by-tick transaction data on the RUB-USD provided by the MICEX3.
To shed light on the global importance and compare the RUB-USD cur-
rency pair to other major currency pairs, we note that spot trades in the
RUB-USD currency pair equal 1.6% of total FX spot trading volume in
2013 and 1.1% in 2016, ranking it as the 12th and 17th mostly heavily
traded currency pair for each period separately. This drop in importance
could possibly be attributed to the Russian currency crisis and accom-
panied economic sanctions. Moreover, the RUB-USD’s importance has
increased from a total of FX trading volume of 0.30% in 1998 to 1.1%
in 2016, making it the second most traded BRICS-currency (Bank for
International Settlements, 2016). The period for which we are able to
obtain data covers the period from January 12, 2000 to December 30,
2014. Our data set contains the following set of information for ev-
ery trade executed on the MICEX, a time-of-day time stamp, the price
at which the order was effectively executed, and the Dollar volume of
the trade. Additionally, the data set contains information on the trade
initiator, but only from November 2010 onwards. For this reason, we
restrict the sample period to November 2010-December 2014. Figure 3.1
describes the evolution of the RUB-USD exchange rate over the (full)
sample period.
The total yearly volume traded in US Dollar increases year after year
till 2012 after which it has reached a yearly volume of more than 400
billion USD as shown in Figure 3.2 .
In Table 3.1 we report summary statistics for our data set. Overall,
we observe that the returns are considerably negatively skewed, have a
very high kurtosis, and exhibit negative first order serial correlation. On
average, the returns are very close to 0 and are characterized by a low
standard deviation.
3MICEX is the largest exchange in Russia and Eastern Europe. For foreign
exchange markets, MICEX centralizes country-wide domestic USD-RUB trading on
one single platform. This platform has been jointly developed with Reuters and
provides similar trading features as for the Reuters or EBS (Electronic Brokerage
Systems) trading platform.
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Figure 3.1: Evolution of the RUB-USD Exchange Rate
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3.2.2 Foreign exchange policy
Given our specific data set it should be noted that in the past decades,
the Bank of Russia changed their exchange rate policy several times. In
1999, the Bank of Russia introduced a managed floating exchange rate
regime, aimed at smoothing exchange rate fluctuations. In order to en-
sure flexibility of monetary policy in their inflation targeting strategy,
they gradually decreased the central bank’s influence on the exchange
rate. Interventions, if any, were exclusively performed in US dollar.
Later on, the managed float was replaced by a dual-currency basket in
2005, consisting of US dollar and Euro. Accordingly the Bank of Rus-
sia intervened in both currencies to limit excessive dual-currency bas-
ket value fluctuations. Shifts in the operational band were performed
considering the balance of payment dynamics and domestic FX market
developments. Over time, the Euro became more important for the Rus-
sian economy and the Bank of Russia fixed the basket at 0.55 USD and
0.45 EUR in early 2007. Most interestingly for our data set, the Russian
central bank gradually increased the width of the band in the course
of the financial crisis and abandoned the dual currency basked in late
2010. Since then the Bank of Russia conducts an FX policy under a
managed floating exchange rate regime still with a dual currency basket,
but without imposing a formal band, while using interventions to smooth
exchange rate fluctuations. Based on these policy shifts we conjecture
that interventions in absence of a formal band aimed at smoothing ex-
change rate fluctuations increase information asymmetries and thus ad-
verse selections costs since these actions contain a surprise element. On
the other hand, these interventions ease and restore (temporary) market
imbalances and thus decrease the (temporary) buy-sell order imbalance
component of the bid-ask spread.
3.3 Methodology
There has been a wide body of literature on the estimation of spreads
(Roll, 1984; Glosten, 1987), the components of spreads, and spread de-
composition models trying to estimate them. These spread decomposi-
tion models can be separated into covariance based approaches (George
et al., 1991; Stoll, 1989) and trade indicator based approaches (Glosten
and Harris, 1988; Madhavan and Smidt, 1991; Huang and Stoll, 1997).
One of the most prominent trade indicator based model used for decom-
posing spread is the Huang and Stoll (1997) model with the two-way
decomposition model being most parsimonious model. Thus model al-
lows researchers to estimate the order processing component and jointly
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the adverse selection and inventory holding component. The three-way
spread decomposition of Huang and Stoll (1997) on the other hand, al-
lows us to decompose the spread further. Specifically, the three-way de-
composition model allows us to estimate the order processing component,
the inventory holding component, and the adverse selection component
separately.
ΔPt =
S
2 ·Qt + (α+ β − 1) ·
S
2 ·Qt−1 − α ·
S
2 · (1− 2pi) ·Qt−2 + et
Qt = (1− 2pi) ·Qt−1 + ut
(3.1)
Where ΔP represents the price change, Qt indicates the direction of a
trade at time t, S represents the bid-ask spread, α equals for the (esti-
mated) adverse selection cost, β represents the inventory holding compo-
nent, and pi is the probability that the next transaction has the opposite
sign as the current transaction. The model above has as disadvantage
that it requires a simultaneous estimation of these two equations, mak-
ing it far from parsimonious. Second, the literature has documented
some estimation problems related to the parameter pi. Huang and Stoll
(1997) argue that the too low estimation of pi results from an observed
positive serial correlation in price changes which may be due to market
participants’ decision of breaking up an order into several smaller or-
ders. They argue that the aggregation of these sliced orders provide an
adequate solution to induce negative serial correlation, allowing a cor-
rect estimation of a trade reversal probability. Henker and Wang (2006),
however, show that the low and negative adverse selection estimates (α)
in Huang and Stoll (1997) their three-way decomposition model are the
result of model misspecification. Another, perhaps more important issue
in light of the current paper, is the fact that the Huang and Stoll (1997)
2-and three-way decomposition model are developed for quote driven
markets, i.e. centered among a market maker. McGroarty et al. (2007)
alter this viewpoint and build a spread decomposition model specifically
designed for order-driven markets such as foreign exchange markets. In
their model, the authors argue and assume that informed traders are set-
ting prices through limit orders (Bloomfield et al., 2005; Goettler et al.,
2009) instead of actively exploiting superior information through market
orders. As a result, the fundamental value, Vt, is now only driven by its
past fundamental value and newly discounted public information.
Vt = Vt−1 + εt (3.2)
At the same time, (temporary) buying or selling pressures could tem-
porarily induce the price to diverge from the true fundamental value.
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Therefore, the distorted fundamental value, V ∗t is a function of (true)
fundamental value and any (temporary) buy-sell order imbalances, Q, in
the market
V ∗t = Vt + β ·
S
2 ·
t−1∑
i=1
Qi (3.3)
The midquote, M, is affected both by the distorted fundamental value
and the information content expressed by the adverse selection compo-
nent (α) as informed traders are submitting limit order. As such, they
jointly determine the appropriate midquote as follows
Mt = V ∗t − α ·
S
2 ·Qt (3.4)
Taking everything together, the above model boils down to the following
price equation in which the price, P, is affected by the fundamental value,
the (temporary) buy-sell order imbalance (β) on the market, and adverse
selection component (α)
Pt = Vt + β · S2 ·
t−1∑
i=1
Qi − α · S2 ·Qt +
S
2 ·Qt + ηt (3.5)
Differencing this equation leads to the following equation, which resem-
bles to the (Huang and Stoll, 1997) decomposition model
ΔPt = (1− α) · S2 ·Qt + (α+ β − 1) ·
S
2 ·Qt−1 + et (3.6)
If quote data is available, then the model can be estimated as it is exactly
identified. In that case the above equation evolves to the following,
more parsimonious model in which the reversion indicator pi, is no longer
required
ΔPt = (1− α) · St2 ·Qt + (α+ β − 1) ·
St
2 ·Qt−1 + et (3.7)
3.4 Results
We start off by discussing some summary statistics on spreads and trans-
actions in panel A of Table 3.2. In particular, we report the time series of
the average spread as well as average number of daily transactions both
for the full as sample as for each year separately. Overall, we observe
that the average number of transactions increases on a yearly basis. The
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average quoted spread in contrast, decreases year after year. The only ex-
ception is 2014, during which the bid-ask spread increased considerably
following heightened uncertainty during the Russian crisis. Following
the state-of-art in the literature, we estimate the spread decomposition
model using GMM (Hansen, 1982). This way, we can account for the
very weak distributional assumptions and potential heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation of an unknown form. The results, as shown in panel
B of Table 3.2, clearly indicate a statistically significant adverse selection
component (α) in the bid-ask spread. This is both the case for the full
sample as when we estimate each year separately. Overall, we observe
that the adverse selection component equals approximately 45% over the
full sample. This result is in line with our expectations, since we are con-
sidering an emerging foreign exchange market. Compared to previous
studies on non-major currencies, our findings are in line with Bjønnes
and Rime (2005) who find an adverse selection component of 49% for
the NOK-DEM. Our results, however, stand in contrast to Frömmel and
Van Gysegem (2012) who only find an adverse selection component of
21% on the HUF-EUR market. Second, we find that the relative im-
portance of the adverse selection component decreases year after year,
from 74.92% in 2010 to 44.41% in 2014 which indicates a growing market
coverage.
Even in 2014 during the Russian crisis, the adverse selection com-
ponent did not increase at all in relative terms. In absolute terms, we
also report a decrease in the adverse selection component year after year,
except for 2014 (Figure 3.3). From this figure, we can clearly illustrate
that the uncertainty during the Russian crisis of 2014 increases market
participants’ perceived probability of being picked off by a market par-
ticipant with superior information. As a result, such uncertainty raises
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. Taking this all
together, we conclude that the absence of observing an increase in the
relative importance of the adverse selection component during the cri-
sis is not due to the lack of higher requirements of protection against
adverse selection but caused by the higher lift in the other two spread
components.
The (temporary) buy-sell order imbalance component is significantly
positive both for the full sample, 18.96% with a p-value of 5.1%, as well
as for every year separately. Overall, we find that the relative impor-
tance of the (temporary) buy-sell order imbalance component seems to
increase over time (Figure 3.3), from around 10% until 2012, to about
20% thereafter. We could possible attribute this to the changing Russian
central bank policy striving towards a fully-floating exchange rate regime
henceforth, the market becoming more mature. As a result, exchange
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Figure 3.3: Absolute Importance of the Bid-Ask Spread Components
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rate interventions happen both less frequent and with less firepower. As
such, increased price-concessions are required when many market par-
ticipants are trading in the same direction and the central bank is less
willing to apply a leaning-against-the-wind policy to stabilize the ex-
change rate. This becomes more apparent in the Russian crisis of 2014
where many market participants likely wanted to oﬄoad or even short
the Russian Ruble. This action could have contributed to the increase
the (absolute) inventory component to 0.002331. This is on average
four times higher than before and resembles 19.23% of the spread, and
let the exchange rate surge to unexplored heights. The residual part,
i.e. the price-clustering component, contributes 35.69% to the spread
over the full sample period. Year on year, we find an increasing relative
importance (Figure 3.3) of this component, especially during 2014.
3.4.1 Spread Components during the Russian Crisis
Next, we zoom in on the Russian crisis and examine whether the spread
and its components change markedly during periods of high stress. We
do this by running the same model separately for every month for in
2014. The results, reported in panel B of Table 3.3, clearly indicate
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Figure 3.4: Absolute Importance of the Bid-Ask Spread Components
during Crisis (2014)
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that during times of crisis, the adverse selection cost (α) contributes
significantly to the full bid-ask spread. More specifically, we find the ad-
verse selection component to be significantly positive every month at the
1% level of significance, remaining relatively stable and ranging between
47.28% and 65.77%. With respect to the composition of the bid-ask
spread, we do not find evidence that the adverse selection component
contributes more to the spread during highly uncertain periods (53.75%
in November and 47.28% in December) versus non-crisis periods. This
finding is somewhat unexpected. Still, we find a small increase in the
adverse selection component before the crisis (61.85% in September and
65.77% in October) reached its full proportion.
The absolute values of the spread (see Figure 3.4) in contrast, clearly
illustrate the effect of the crisis on the spread and its components. The
effect of the crisis began to materialize slowly in September 2014 and
resulted into a higher spread as 2014 progressed. Each component, how-
ever, seems to have contributed to a similar extent to the increase in the
bid-ask spread. In November and December 2014, the bid-ask spread
began to increase significantly, indicating that liquidity providers were
starting to ask considerably more protection against adverse selection.
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At the end 2014 when the crisis began to reach its full proportions,
the (temporary) buy-sell order imbalance component (absolute) grew to
0.002879 and 0.008272 in the last two months which is four and eight
times higher than before and partly explains the observed increase in
the bid-ask spread. In relative terms, this component is lower and not
higher than usual. We attribute this particular result to the Russian
central bank that was fiercely supporting the exchange rate by selling
USD for RUB. As such, a major market participant was standing on
the other side therefore reducing the order imbalance on the market.
Therefore, this component is in relative terms smaller during the midst
crisis when the central bank was intervening than before when they were
not.
3.5 Conclusion
This papers examines the bid-ask spread components by applying the
spread decomposition model of McGroarty et al. (2007) build for an or-
der driven market. We apply the model over a long-time span for the
RUB-USD, a previously unexplored foreign exchange market data set.
We find a decline in the bid-ask spread year on year. Except for the
Russian crisis in 2014, the spread has grown to much larger propor-
tions. Furthermore, in line with previous work on spread decomposition
(Bjønnes and Rime, 2005) we find that overall, 45% of the spread can be
attributed to adverse selection, although the relative importance of this
component is decreasing year on year. This suggests that an increase in
market coverage is taking place, making information more widespread
and thereby decreasing uncertainty. Moreover, we observe an increased
demand for protection (in absolute terms) against adverse selection dur-
ing the Russian crisis in 2014. This finding is mostly driven by the final
months of 2014 when the crisis became full-fledged. However, somewhat
unexpectedly, the relative importance of the adverse selection component
does not increase during periods of high uncertainty.
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Chapter 4
The Accuracy of Trade
Classification Systems on
the Foreign Exchange
Market: Evidence from
the RUB-USD Market1
4.1 Introduction
In many financial applications it is crucial to know whether the initiator
of a trade was the active or the passive trader. A formal definition of the
term trade initiator is primordial if one wants to assess the accuracy of
trade classification systems. An explicit definition of the term ‘initiator’
is nonetheless hardly ever given in the literature. Odders-White (2000)
distinguishes two definitions, first the immediacy definition sees traders
who demand immediate execution as the initiators. Traders who placed
market orders or limit orders at the quotes, which essentially is the same,
are thus tagged as initiators, while traders who placed limit orders are
viewed as non-initiators or passive suppliers of liquidity2. Second, the
1This chapter is based on joint work with Dick D’Hoore and Michael Frömmel
(Ghent University).
2There are few cases in which this definition is problematic: when crossed market
orders are executed, when limit orders are matched with each other and when market
orders are stopped. All cases occur frequently on financial markets, according to
the study by Lee and Radhakrisna (1996), this is the case in 12%, 17% and 29%
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chronological definition which is broader. The trader, both buying or
selling, who placed his or her order last is the initiator. These two def-
initions are similar in many cases, as the initiator always causes the
transaction to occur. However, the latter can certainly be applied with
crossed market orders, a limit order matching another limit order and
stopped market orders. This definition is often used for markets where
no market maker or specialist is present to provide liquidity, thus for
interbank foreign exchange markets. Knowing who is the trade initiator
is crucial for two key concepts in market microstructure: order flow and
bid-ask spreads. Order flow is defined as the difference between trades
initiated by the buyer and trades initiated by the seller of a currency,
thus the sum of signed transactions. The order flow can be described
as buying or selling pressure, shows a close empirical relation to the ex-
change rate (Lyons et al., 2001; Evans and Lyons, 2002; Payne, 2003)
and carries private information (Frömmel et al., 2008). From the defi-
nition of order flow, it is clear that knowing whether the initiator of a
transaction is buying or selling is of crucial importance to the outcome
of these studies. For the estimation of the bid-ask spread components,
Huang and Stoll (1997) used methods based on a trade indicator variable.
Peterson and Sirri (2003) did the same for the accurate calculation of
effective spreads. Empirical applications include testing for the presence
of informed traders (Easley et al., 1996), measuring the information con-
tent of trades (Hasbrouck, 1991) and intraday momentum (Elaut et al.,
2016). Unfortunately, most data sets do not contain the trade direction
hence inferring who initiated the trade has always been complicated,
even more so in today’s high frequency setting. That is why many re-
searchers use trade classification systems to determine who is buying and
who is selling.
Although some research has been conducted in the efficacy of trade
classification systems, most of them focus on equity markets. The foreign
exchange market on the other hand has not yet been covered to the same
extent and some questions remain unanswered. Our contribution to the
literature is twofold: first, we add to the recent literature by comparing
popular available trade classification systems on real world data. The
set of trade classification rules we compare is extraordinarily broad and
covers all relevant approaches that have been suggested so far. Second,
we assess the accuracy of the various trading indicator classifiers for a
foreign exchange market. As Theissen (2001) points out, and is reflected
in the literature review later in this manuscript, markets’ microstructure
substantially affects the accuracy of trade classification systems. In other
words, a different market structure changes the “game played by the
respectively on the NYSE.
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market participants” (Rime, 2003, p471). It is therefore necessary to
analyze trade classification rules for different markets.
The foreign exchange market substantially differs from equity mar-
kets, which is covered by the vast majority of empirical contributions
on trade classification rules. It is decentralized, but highly concentrated
in London and New York, has no designated market makers, is self-
regulated, and has no margins and no short sale restrictions (Omrane
and Welch, 2016). It is a two-tier market, separated into the interbank
market, where on the one hand professional currency traders deal with
each other and where price discovery takes place, and on the other hand
the customer market, where customers trade with the banks and sub-
mit their orders, which are finally executed on the interbank market.
Since the mid-1990s electronic communication networks have emerged
as a subset to the customer market, as a formalized way for customers
to trade with each other. Some ECN focus on small corporations, others
on retail investors (Rime, 2003). Due to their lack of liquidity most ECN
are crossing networks, i.e. they obtain prices from other trading venues
without own price discovery. At the same time, the trading volume on
the foreign exchange market by far exceeds the one of all other markets,
with a daily turnover of about 5.1 trillion USD (Bank for International
Settlements, 2016). In addition, the foreign exchange has a strong im-
pact on the real economy (King et al., 2011) hence it is highly relevant
for the real economy.
Studies having trade initiator classified data of the foreign exchange
market are extremely rare, only few data sets with signed data have
been exploited in the literature (Omrane and Welch, 2016). In their
study they use data from an ECN3, which is a network designed for non-
reporting dealers and has very specific characteristics. In addition, their
data set covers two years whereas our data set covers 3.5 years of the
interbank market. Furthermore our study applies a far broader range of
trade classification rules than Omrane and Welch (2016).
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the
various classification rules and discusses their performance in past liter-
ature. Section 4.3 describes the characteristics of the RUB/USD market
and the data. Section 4.4 describes the applied methodology, section 4.5
discusses the results and section 4.6 summarizes and concludes.
3As Omrane and Welch (2016) state, “ECN data has poorer classification success
across all the algorithms and because of the dominance of electronic markets today,
recent studies like Chakrabarty et al. (2007) are perhaps more relevant.”
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4.2 Trade Classification Rules (TCR)
The research concerning trade classification algorithms or trade classifi-
cation systems is not very elaborate, nor is it very old. While Blume et al.
(1989) and Hasbrouck (1988) were the first to apply trade classification
rules, Lee and Ready (1991) were the first to systematically compare
and analyze the performance of TCRs. In general we can distinguish
trade-by-trade classification rules, which assign a binary value (buyer-
or seller-initiated) to every single observed trade and bulk-classification
rules, which assign a probability for being buyer- or seller-initiated to
a bulk, defined by time, volume, or amount of trades. In this section
we will first briefly introduce the most commonly used TCRs, before we
review the literature on performance evaluation for TCRs.
4.2.1 Trade-by-trade classification rules
The Tick rule (Blume et al., 1989) is the simplest TCR, as it only requires
transaction data. It is based on the price movements relative to the
preceding trades. If the current price is higher (an uptick), then the
trade is classified as a buy. If the current price is lower (a downtick), the
trade is classified as a sell. In the special case that no price change occurs,
it is the last prior uptick or downtick that is taken into consideration4.
The functioning of the tick rule is displayed in Figure 4.1. A variation
on the tick rule is the Reverse Tick rule. The current price is compared
to the following price, instead of the preceding price. If the following
price is higher (lower), the current trade is classified as a sell (buy). As
long as the price follows a price reversal pattern, i.e. B(uy)-S(ell)-B(uy)-
S(ell), both rules yield the same results. The classification will differ, as
soon as there are sequential price movements in the same direction, e.g.
B-B-S-S. The literature generally doubts the effectiveness of this RTR
rule and therefore it is rarely used.
The Quote rule defined by Hasbrouck (1988) uses more information
as it obviously relies on quote data. Transactions above the spread
midpoint, entailing those at the ask, are classified as buys. Transactions
below the spread midpoint, entailing those at the bid, are classified as
sells5. Transactions at the spread midpoint remain unclassified6.
4Lee and Ready (1991) call this a ‘zero-uptick’, or ‘zero-downtick’, depending on
whether the last price change was upwards or downwards.
5In the so-called ‘at-the-quote rule trades are only classified when they occur at
the best ask or bid price. The rules is rarely used, since it substantially restricts the
available data.
6Lee and Ready also proposed a ‘5 second rule’. In that time, quotes were updated
on a computer inside the specialist’s post, while the trade was typically recorded by
the specialist’s clerk. It could occur that the quotes were updated faster than the
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The Lee and Ready rule (LR rule) is in fact a combination of tick
rule and quote rule. Lee and Ready (1991) suggest to apply the quote
rule where possible, and use the tick rule to classify the trades at the
midpoint, which are left unclassified by the quote rule. This was based
on the quote rule performing better outside the midpoint, whereas the
tick rule was able to classify 85% of the trades at the midpoint correctly
(Lee and Ready, 1991). Due to its good performance and simple im-
plementation the LR rule is one of the most widely used TCR. When
applying the LR rule to data from the NASDAQ Ellis et al. (2000) ob-
served a bias (i.e. a consistently reduced accuracy) in the classification of
large trades, trades during high volume periods and ECN trades. They
attributed this bias to the classification of trades executed inside the
quotes. Accordingly, they proposed the EMO rule7Ellis et al. (2000),
which slightly differs from the LR rule since it relies more on the tick
test. They wanted to address the reduced accuracy of the classification
of trades inside the quotes. Therefore only trades at the quotes are cat-
egorized using the quote rule, while all the trades inside the quotes are
categorized based on the tick rule.
A variant of the former rule is the MEMO rule as suggested by
Chakrabarty et al. (2007). It differs from the EMO rule by classify-
ing trades using the quote rule for all trades executed at the bid (ask)
or 30 percent of the spread above the bid (below the ask), whereas the
tick rule is used for the 40 inner percent of the spread.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the various trade-by-trade classification rules.
It is obvious that for the first four trades, characterized by a zig-zag
pattern and trades performed at the quote the rules show no difference.
Differences between the TCRs occur as soon as trades within the quotes
occur. For this reason the market structure is an important feature for
assessing the accuracy of TCRs. Trades with conflicting signals from the
TCRs are shaded in grey.
4.2.2 Bulk Volume Classification
While the research on traditional trade-by-trade TCR dates back 25
years to the first extensive study done by Lee and Ready (1991), no real
radical changes have occurred ever since. TCR remained combinations
of a quote rule and a tick rule, with research showing better results for
transactions that triggered them. This could lead to an incorrect classification and
it is thus unsuitable to compare the quotes and trades. They demonstrated that if
the execution prices are compared to quotes reported at least 5 seconds before the
trade was reported, superior results were achieved. Their argument, however, does
obviously not apply to modern FX trading.
7In their paper Ellis et al. (2000) refer to it as the quote-tick rule.
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Figure 4.1: Illustration of trade-by-trade rules
the more recent EMO and MEMO rules. The performance increase is
rather incremental which explains why the easy-to-use TR is still used
extensively. The proposition of Easley et al. (2016) to rethink the way
TCR are used to discern the underlying information from the data can
thus be seen as revolutionary. The Bulk Volume Classification (BVC)
allocates a bulk of trades into buy and sell order flow, which is obviously
very different to assigning an individual trade as either a buy or a sell.
Easley et al. (2016) regard the rise of big data and the resulting ever
increasing need to process large data as an important issue, which may
seriously strain the resources (both time and hardware) of researchers,
and question the need to know the true initiators for every single trade.
That’s why they propose the BVC, a new TCR that replaces previous
discrete trade-by-trade TCR with a continuous classification of proba-
bilistic nature, more closely resembling a Bayesian approach by providing
the probability of an outcome. Namely, BVC allocates a bulk of trades
into buy and sell order flow. This is very different to assigning an indi-
vidual trade as either a buy or a sell. This is done by using trade volume
over either fixed time, volume or trades intervals. Next, the standard-
ized price change between the beginning and the end of the interval is
calculated to estimate the share of buy and sell volume. It should be
intuitively clear that the larger (more positive) this price change is, the
more probable that the underlying trades were buyer initiated and vice
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versa. Overall, they conclude that the BVC is superior to the incum-
bent TCR on index and commodity futures data, both in accuracy and
resource requirements.
As an example, suppose the following sequence of 10 trades with true
initiator known: BBSSBBSSBB. A trade-by-trade TCR could classify
these trades as BSBBSBBSBS, which would give an accuracy of only
40%. The Bulk Accuracy Ratio (BAR) is defined as the fraction of
overall volume correctly classified within bars. A bar is a aggregation of
trades that occur within a given time period (e.g. one hour), the volume
traded (e.g. 10 000 000 USD) or the amount of trades that occurred
(e.g. 1000 trades). The formula to calculate the BAR is as follows:
BAR =
∑
τ
[
min
(
V Bτ ,
¯V Bτ
)
+ min
(
V Sτ , V¯
S
τ
)]
∑
τ Vτ
(4.1)
Where Vτ equals the total volume, V Bτ and V Sτ represent the true buying
and selling volume and ¯V Bτ and V¯ Sτ represent the predicted buying and
selling volume in interval τ . For our example, in the following case we
find the following BAR:
BAR =
∑
τ
[
min
(
6, 6¯
)
+ min
(
4, 4¯
)]
10 = 100% (4.2)
Note that if the amount of aggregation increases, more offsetting happens
between individually misclassified trades. To calculate predicted buying
and selling volume the following formulas are used:
V Bτ = Vτ · CDFt
(
Pτ − Pτ−1
σ∆P
, df
)
(4.3)
V Sτ = Vτ ·
(
1 − CDFt
(
Pτ − Pτ−1
σ∆P
, df
))
(4.4)
Where t equals the cumulative distribution function (CDF) of a Stu-
dent´s t-disctribution with df degrees of freedom, Pτ−Pτ−1 price change
between consecutive bars calculated as the difference between the last
price of the current bar and the last price of the preceding bar and σ∆P
equals the standard deviation of the price changes.
4.2.3 The Performance of TCR
A couple of studies empirically test the performance of TCRs. These
studies however, focus almost exclusively on equity and commodity mar-
kets. Furthermore, they are often restricted to a subset of TCRs. Nonethe-
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less, we review some of the existing empirical literature in this section
and summarize the findings in Table 4.1.
In their seminal paper, Lee and Ready (1991) test he performance
of their own LR rule and find that it correctly classifies trades on the
NYSE with a 90.9% success rate. In their data set the share of trades
at the quote was 60.6%, while 22.8% were at the midpoint. The rest
was inside or – in 0.5 percent of the cases – outside the spread. Wood
and McCorry (1994) analyze the tick rule and find a lower accuracy
or 80-82% for the NASDAQ, from which they conclude that the per-
formance highly depends on the market structure. Aitken and Frino
(1996) find a 75% success rate for the tick rule (90% for non-zero ticks),
when they apply it to data from the Australian Stock Exchange (ASX).
The ASX is an order-matching system without a prominent role for a
market-maker/specialist. However, their study suffers from some data
restrictions: Trades can only occur at bid or ask prices, making it im-
possible to study the accuracy of the LR algorithm. Since no true trade
initiator was available, they used the Quote rule as a proxy. They mim-
icked the LR study and expressed doubts about the robustness of their
results in different markets, after having identified six potential types
of classification errors. Also, further analysis provided evidence that a
volatile or trending market decreases the accuracy of the tick rule and
makes it less likely to accurately classify seller initiated trades and small
buyer initiated trades.
Lee and Radhakrishna (2000) study the TORQ data set8, thus again
data from the NYSE. For the 60% of observations which they can classify
as either buyer or seller initiated, they report a success rate of 93%
for the LR rule. The same data set and TCR are used by Odders-
White (2000). She reports a somewhat lower success rate of 85%, but
finds a systematic misclassification by the LR rule for trades at the
midpoint, small transactions and large and frequently traded stocks.
Consistent with her findings and again for TORQ data, Finucane (2000)
reports a success rate of 84% for the LR rule compared with an only
marginally lower accuracy of 83% for the reverse tick test. He explains
the surprisingly good performance of the reverse tick rule by the specific
structure of the sample, including market order crosses (16%), stopped
market orders (26%), and quote changes between the trades (43%).
Theissen (2001) is one of the few analyzing the accuracy of the LR
rule (besides the tick rule) for a non-US market. He uses data from the
Frankfurt Stock Exchange and a benchmark classification based on the
8The TORQ data set is a subsample of detailed trade data on 144 firms listed
on the NYSE. It was collected under supervision of Joel Hasbrouck, see Lee and
Radhakrishna (2000).
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position taken by the specialist (“amtlicher Kursmakler”). He finds a
remarkably low accuracy for both rules (72.2% for the TR and 72.8%
for the LR rule) and no statistically significant difference in the accuracy
between the rules. He explains the odd results by the existence of the
courtage (a commission paid on all trades) and cross-sectional patterns
in Makler or specialist participation rates. He concludes that there are
large differences in the performance of trade classification algorithms
across markets.
Ellis et al. (2000) apply the quote rule, the tick rule, the LR rule and
their own EMO rule to data for 313 NASDAQ stocks. They find that
the EMO rule outperforms the other rules with an accuracy of 81.9%
compared to 76.4% (QR), 77.66% (TR) and 81.05% (LR). However, the
improvement over the LR rule is marginal.
Chakrabarty et al. (2007) analyze data from 750 NASDAQ stocks
traded on two ECNs (INET and ArcaEx). They apply a wide range of
classification algorithms: the tick rule, the Lee and Ready algorithm, the
EMO rule suggested by Ellis et al. (2000) and the MEMO rule suggested
by themselves. They find that all rules provide accuracies between 74.4%
(LR) and 76.5% (MEMO). They do, however stress, that the MEMO rule
substantially outperforms the other rules for trades inside the quote.
Few studies analyze the performance of bulk-based classification algo-
rithms. Chakrabarty et al. (2013) compare the bulk-volume-classification
(BVC) to the tick rule. They find that the TR clearly outperforms the
BVC by 7.4 to 16.3 percentage points, whereas the BVC substantially
reduces the computational time by up to 75%. Similarly for data from
Euronext Paris, Panayides et al. (2014) find an accuracy for the BVC of
up to 90.90% for the average over three different sample periods, whereas
the tick rule and the LR rule reach up to 96.57 and 95.79% respectively.
Again the advantage of the BVC is rather in terms of computational
speed than in accuracy, and the BVC performance increases with bar
size.
For a data set of option trades from the CBOE Savickas and Wilson
(2003) find a substantially lower accuracy of 59%, 83%, 80% and 78%
for the tick rule, quote rule LR rule and EMO rule respectively. They
see the high share of reversed quote trades (buys at the bid and sells at
the ask) and wrong-side quotes (buys below the bid and sells above the
ask) as the main reason for the poor performance.
Lu et al. (2009) apply a modified LR rule to ECN data for 684 stocks
from the Taiwan Stock Exchange and achieve an accuracy of 97% (com-
pared with 74%, 93%, and 95% for the tick rule, the quote rule and
the EMO rule respectively). Omrane and Welch (2016) recently stud-
ied the accuracy of the tick rule and BVC on EUR/USD, JPY/USD
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and GBP/USD from Hotspot (an electronic communication network).
In their data set they deal with asynchronous trade and quote records
and therefore the tick rule’s performance deteriorates to an accuracy of
65.9%, 69.8% and 66.3% for their three currency pairs. It is thus re-
markably low, and even falls substantially for zero ticks. Furthermore
they find a strong asymmetry between seller and buyer initiated trades
and more specifically they noticed an excessively low accuracy for buyer
initiated trades in down quote changes. When they compare the group
tick test to BVC (time bars) they confirm the results from other studies
and find a superior performance of the tick rule.
Besides pure tests of the accuracy a couple of papers deal with special
cases: Asquith et al. (2010) apply the quote rule, the tick rule, and the
LR rule to a sample of short sales for 200 NASDAQ stocks and find that
short sales are likely to be misclassified as buyer-initiated. In contrast,
Chakrabarty et al. (2012) question the assumption that short sales are
predominantly seller-initiated and that misclassification is much less of
a problem.
The literature has also highlighted biases in trade indicator classi-
fiers that are of relevance the related literature. For example, Boehmer
et al. (2007) stress the importance of the trade classification algorithm
for estimating the probability of informed trading (PIN). They show an-
alytically that inaccurate trade classification leads to downward-biased
estimates for the PIN, The magnitude of the bias is affected by the se-
curity’s trading intensity. These findings are confirmed by an empirical
analysis based on data from the New York Exchange. Finally they pro-
pose a data-based adjustment procedure for reducing the bias. Perlin
et al. (2014) provide a stochastic version of the tick test that could be
used for correcting biases.
4.3 Data
Our study uses transactions and quotes from the US Dollar-Russian Ru-
ble market, and covers the period from mid-2011 to 2014. The RUB/USD
rate is one of the more heavily traded exchanges rates: The ‘Triennial
Central Bank Survey of foreign exchange activity (Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements, 2016) ranks it as the 12th and 17th most important
currency pair in 2013 and 2017 and with a share in global turnover of
1.6% and 1.1% respectively. Over the sample period, it is ranked as the
second most important currency from a BRICS country (with the Chi-
nese Yuan/US Dollar ranked first) during our sample period. Table 4.2
gives some descriptive statistics of our data set and clearly indicates the
increased activity on the exchange.
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Table 4.2: Descriptive Statistics on our Data Set
2011 2012 2013 2014
Num 499 779 1 189 595 1 524 877 1 998 651
Max 32.831 34.198 33.504 80.200
Min 27.392 28.834 29.870 33.025
Mean 30.109 31.174 32.009 40.605
Median 30.530 31.180 32.264 36.220
Std 1.502 1.061 0.946 8.124
This table provides summary statistics on the trading ac-
tivity and price changes over our sample period.
Figure 4.2: Evolution of the RUB/USD Rate during the Sample Period
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Table 4.3: Sample of the Data Set
Date Time Price Bid Ask Buy/Sell
7/06/2011 0.41762 27.835 27.8216 27.8340 1
7/06/2011 0.41762 27.8361 27.8216 27.8340 1
7/06/2011 0.41765 27.8453 27.8280 27.8438 1
7/06/2011 0.41766 27.8281 27.8282 27.8475 -1
This table provides a sample of our intraday dat set which con-
taints for every transaction the accompanying date and times-
tamp, the best standing quotes and the buy/ sell indicator.
Figure 4.2 displays the evolution of the RUB/USD rate during the
sample period. It is obvious that the exchange rate was comparatively
stable during the first three years of the sample, with low volatility. In
2014, however, due to the crisis in Ukraine, the deterioration of the oil
price and high inflation in Russia, the Ruble sharply depreciated and
fell to 80 RUB/USD, whereas the rate between 2011 and 2013 was in
the range between 27.392 and 33.504 RUB/USD. Table 4.3 displays a
sample of the data set. Time is stored as a fraction of the day, e.g.
0.4172 in the table corresponds to 10:01. Trading starts at 10:00 a.m.
and ends at 5.00 p.m. Prices are expressed in Ruble paid or received per
one US dollar. Finally the variable Buy/Sell indicates whether the trade
was buyer-initiated (+1) or seller-initiated (-1). The fact that the true
trade initiator is known, allows us to evaluate the performance of trade
classification systems throughout the sample period.
Since the position of the trades relative to the bid-ask spread is im-
portant for the evaluation of the TCRs and trades are treated in different
ways by the TCRs depending on whether they are at the bid or ask price,
inside the spread or at the midpoint, it is worth to take a look at their
distribution (Table 4.4). The vast majority of trades (74.1 %) in our
sample takes place at the quotes, with 35.4% at the bid and 38.9% at
the ask. In comparison to Lu et al. (2009) trades only occur at the
quotes, whereas Chakrabarty et al. (2007) use a sample where only 57%
of their trades in the ECN take place at the quotes. Furthermore in
our sample 15.99% of trades take place inside the quotes, of which only
0.44% happen at the midpoint. Almost 10% of the trades were executed
at prices outside the quotes. The ticks are almost evenly distributed be-
tween zero and non-zero-ticks. The high number of trades at the quotes
in our sample suggest a good performance of TCRs based on the quote
rule, i.e. the quote rule itself, the Lee and Ready rule, the EMO rule
and the modified EMO rule. However, the respective columns in Ta-
ble 4.4 show that the distribution has substantially changed over the
74
years and contains there are two interesting observations. First, while
in 2011 more than 30% of trades were executed outside the quotes, the
fraction dropped in 2012 and 2013 and finally reached 1.54% in 2014. A
potential explanation is the increasing liquidity and development of the
RUB/USD market. Second, in the crisis year 2014 we observe a huge
increase of trades inside the quote, from less than one percent to more
than 40%. We will discuss how these features affect the performance of
the TCRs.
4.4 Methodology
We test the most widely used trade classification rules on our RUB/USD
data set described in section 4.2. Most trade-by-trade rules are in fact
combinations of the tick rule and the quote rule. In this respect, the
BVC rule is an exception. The accuracy of the trade-by-trade TCR are
tested as follows: the predicted trade directions are calculated accord-
ing to the rules as described in section 4.2.1 and compared with the
true classification as given in the data set. The classification can be
correct (1) or wrong (0). The percentage of correctly classified trades
equals the accuracy of the TCR. Therefore the higher the accuracy, the
better the rule is performing. In very few cases no bid or ask prices
are available9, therefore we have excluded these observations from our
data set. Comparing BVC with the trade-by-trade classifications is not
straightforward, as the latter classifies each trade as either a buy or a
sell trade-by-trade, while BVC allocates a bulk of trades into buy and
sell volume.
4.5 Results
4.5.1 Tick-by-tick Rules
Table 4.5 summarizes the performance of the trade-by-trade rules over
the whole sample period in the first row. It is striking that the RTR
substantially underperforms with an accuracy of only 46.42 %. The tick
rule correctly classifies only 70.58% whereas the remaining rules all reach
an accuracy of more than 85%. While this is lower than what is usually
found on equity markets, it is in line with the study by Omrane and
Welch (2016) for an FX ECN. They attribute the underperformance of
the tick rules to the specific structure of the FX market. The remaining
9This applies to 4468 trades in our sample, in which the ask price was missing.
For 25 trades of neither the bid nor the ask price was available. On a total of 5,212,902
trades, this corresponds to only 0.0857%.
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Table 4.5: Accuracy of Trade-by-trade TCRs
RTR TR QR LR EMO MEMO
2011-2014 46.42% 70.58% 85.78% 86.10% 86.26% 86.85%
2011 49.10% 62.32% 78.10% 78.11% 75.49% 75.89%
2012 48.62% 66.17% 89.42% 89.42% 89.07% 89.19%
2013 49.36% 68.58% 90.27% 90.27% 90.16% 90.22%
2014 42.21% 76.79% 82.11% 82.93% 84.32% 85.63%
This table provides and overview of the accuracy of the various trade-
by-trade classification rules over our sample period as a whole and
for every year separately.
rules perform quite similarly with accuracies between 85.78% (QR) and
86.85% (MEMO). The results are in line with Chakrabarty et al. (2007)
who find that the MEMO rule performs best, but in our sample the differ-
ences are smaller. Furthermore our accuracy is similar to studies based
on NYSE data (Lee and Radhakrishna, 2000; Odders-White, 2000; Fin-
ucane, 2000), but better than those for NASDAQ data (Ellis et al., 2000;
Chakrabarty et al., 2007) and the Frankfurt Stock Exchange (Theissen,
2001). The relatively small improvement of the LR, EMO and MEMO
rules over the quote rule can be explained by low number of prices in-
side the spread, including trades at the midpoint. In a second step we
analyze how the rules perform under varying market conditions by look-
ing at their accuracy on yearly subsamples. The results are displayed
in rows 2-5 in Table 4.5. Indeed the years 2011 and 2014 show remark-
able differences. In 2011, which was characterized by a large fraction of
trades outside the quotes, all rules but the RTR perform worse than in
the other years. For the EMO and MEMO rule, the lower performance
of 2011 compared to the next year is up to 14 percentage points. In
contrast 2012 and 2013 have been characterized by low volatility and a
high share of trades executed at the quotes. Accordingly the accuracy
generally increases. In 2014 we observe more than 40% of trades inside
the quotes, which again deteriorates the accuracy. Only the tick rule
shows a higher accuracy in 2014. While this contradicts the lower per-
formance of the tick rule in volatile and trending markets as found by
Aitken and Frino (1996), it may be due to the higher share of non-zero
ticks in 2014. Finally, we examine the accuracy of the rules conditional
on the characteristics of the trades. More precisely we examine the ac-
curacy separately for the buy and sell side (Aitken and Frino, 1996;
Omrane and Welch, 2016), for trades inside the quote (Ellis et al., 2000;
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Table 4.6: Accuracy of Trade-by-trade TCRs and Location of the Trades
TR QR LR EMO MEMO
Part A: Initiation
Buy 67,46% 82,91% 83,14% 82,62% 83,55%
Sell 74,78% 89,64% 90,08% 91,17% 91,29%
Part B: Location of the trades
Inside quotes 69,57% 67,01% 69,00% 69,57% 73,24%
Zero ticks 65,82% 83,80% 84,07% 84,88% 84,74%
Non-zero ticks 75,15% 87,68% 88,04% 87,59% 88,87%
Total 70,58% 85,78% 86,10% 86,26% 86,85%
This table provides an overview of the classification accuracy. Panel
A provides data on the accuracy of trade classification rules with
respect to initiation. Panel B provides accuracy figures with respect
to the location of the trade.
Chakrabarty et al., 2007)10, and for zero versus non-zero ticks (Aitken
and Frino, 1996; Theissen, 2001; Chakrabarty et al., 2007; Omrane and
Welch, 2016). The results are displayed in Table 4.6. First, we confirm
the asymmetry in buyer and seller-initiated trades found by Aitken and
Frino (1996) and Omrane and Welch (2016), with seller initiated trades
performing remarkably better than buyer initiated trades (the average
difference is 7.46% for all TCR). Second, for all quote based rules we find
lower accuracy for trades inside the quotes, whereas the tick rule’s perfor-
mance is not affected. Again our results corroborate with the empirical
literature. Third and finally, we find a substantial underperformance of
the tick rule for zero tick trades, which is 9.33 percentage points lower
than for non-zero ticks, whereas the difference is on average only 3.67
percentage points for the quote based rules.
4.5.2 Bulk Volume Classification (BVC)
We now turn to the evaluation of the BVC. Before we compare it to
the tick-by-tick rules as discussed in the previous section, we perform
some considerations on the BVC, such as the choice of the bar size and
the stand-alone accuracy. The impact of trade bar size on the BVC’s
accuracy is given in Table 4.7. Note that there is no theoretical guide-
10The EMO and MEMO rule were specifically created to cope with this problem
and their superior performance should thus imply that this bias is also present in this
study. Odders-White (2000) and Theissen (2001) also reported worse performances
for trades occurring on the midpoint of the bid-ask spread, which is a specific case
of trades occurring inside the quotes. We do, however, not look at trades at the
midpoint, because there are too few of them in our sample.
78
Table 4.7: Accuracy of BVC
Trade bar size BVC
10 76.50%
25 81.96%
50 84.88%
100 86.97%
250 88.72%
500 89.58%
1000 90.10%
2500 90.45%
5000 90.45%
10000 89.87%
20000 89.64%
This table shows the accuracy
of the BVC for various trade
size bars.
line on how many trades should form one bar but based on our results
and taking into account the average amount of trades per day and the
decreasing improvements in BVC’s performance, bar sizes of 250, 500
and 1000 trades are deemed the most appropriate. The accuracy of
the classification rules are in line with the 88.97% to 93.57% found by
Easley et al. (2016) but substantial higher than the 71.1% to 78.2% of
Chakrabarty et al. (2013).
Second, the accuracy of the BVC depends on the supposed underly-
ing distribution of price changes. Easley et al. (2016) suggest a Student
t-distribution with df = 0.25, while Chakrabarty et al. (2013) opt for a
normal distribution, noting no significant differences when compared to
t-distributions with various degrees of freedom. Table 4.8 compares the
accuracy conditional on various distributions. We find that the perfor-
mance is slightly better for lower degrees of freedom. As a consequence
we rely on the same distribution as Easley et al. (2016).
Third, Chakrabarty et al. (2013) express concerns regarding the nega-
tive effect of overnight returns on the performance of BVC. That problem
does not occur in the analysis by Easley et al. (2016), who use quasi-
continuously traded futures contracts. When omitting overnight returns
to exclude possible skewed price changes, Easley et al. (2016) do not find
qualitatively different performances compared to when overnight returns
were included. Table 4.9 shows the effect of overnight returns on BVC in
our analysis. Leaving them out increases the accuracy of BVC slightly
with 0.08 to 0.11 percentage points, which seems negligible when con-
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Table 4.9: BVC and Overnight Returns
Trade bar
size
BVC BVC (excl.
overnight
returns)
250 88.72% 88.82%
500 89.58% 89.66%
1000 90.10% 90.21%
This table compares the performance of the
BVC when overnight returns are included or
excluded.
sidering the disadvantages of increased computational time and loss of
data. As such, we confirm the results by Chakrabarty et al. (2013) and
do not exclude overnight returns in our analysis.
Fourth, the main advantage of BVC as advocated by Easley et al.
(2016) is its resource efficiency and especially time savings. We there-
fore briefly scrutinize this claim. To fully utilize the power of BVC, it
is necessary to work with vendor-compressed data, i.e. data that has
already been aggregated in bars by the provider, as in the data set used
by Easley et al. (2016). In contrast, when dealing with individual trade
data as in the data set used by Chakrabarty et al. (2013) and in our
study, this aggregation has to be done first before applying BVC. Table
4.10 displays the computational time in seconds when applying different
TCR. If solely the application of the TCR for the signing of trades is
considered, as would be the case for vendor-compressed data, we find
a duration of 0.22s for BVC and an average of 1.07s for trade-by-trade
TCR11. This corresponds with a time efficiency ratio of 20.5%, i.e. BVC
is five times faster than the average tick-by-tick TCR. However, when
the preparatory work of aggregating trades in bars is also considered,
the total computational time for BVC becomes 0.58s and the efficiency
ratio declines to 54.3%. Chakrabarty et al. (2013) report an efficiency
ratio of 25% in their study, which is substantially better than the ratio
found here. It can therefore be concluded that although BVC offers some
time savings, they are not as extraordinary as suggested by Easley et al.
(2016) and further depend on the data available to the researcher.
In a final step we compare the BVC to the incumbent trade-by-
trade TCRs. As already discussed, this comparison requires to adapt
the trade-by-trade TCR so that they also aggregate the classifications
in bars. As this allows for offsetting, the BAR or the fraction of overall
11Since these computational times can be slightly differ for different runs, they
should only be seen as a rough indications for the sake of comparison.
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Table 4.10: Computational Time for the Alternative TCRs
BVC TR QR LR EMO MEMO
Aggregation 0.3617
Signing 0.2199 1.2864 0.8520 0.8837 1.0159 1.3186
This table shows the time required for executing various trade classifi-
cation rules.
volume correctly classified within bars of all TCR are then comparable.
Table 4.11 displays the results. The BVC does not increase the accuracy
over aggregated trade-by-trade TCRs: its performance is slightly worse
than the one from the tick rule, but clearly outperformed by the quote-
based rules. The findings by Easley et al. (2016) are quite similar, but
they conclude that the underperformance is acceptable in the light of the
BVC’s other advantages. Chakrabarty et al. (2013) report much larger
performance differences.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper reviews the literature on trade classification rules and applies
them to a unique data set of tick-by-tick trades in the Russian Ruble-US
dollar market traded on the MICEX. This is the first evaluation of TCRs
on the FX interbank market and at the same time the most exhaustive
comparison of TCRs. The accuracy of tick-by-tick rules in our data set
are in line with existing literature. The MEMO improved on all previ-
ous TCRs and is currently the best choice for classifying trades. When
quote data is not present, the TR yields a considerably lower accuracy.
Its ease-of-use makes it nonetheless very useful for many researchers.
Yearly variations in the accuracy can be attributed to the difference in
the location where trades have occurred. Not surprisingly, trades ex-
ecuted at the quotes are the most informative for buy/sell intention.
Furthermore, the most important biases encountered in literature have
been confirmed in this study: seller initiated trades perform remarkably
better than buyer initiated trades. The EMO rule, and especially the
MEMO rule, offer substantial improvements over LR as they have far
more power for classifying trades that occurred inside the quotes. The
biggest disadvantage of the TR is its poor performance for zero ticks.
The recently suggested BVC, a TCR that uses bulk classification instead
of trade-by-trade classification performs best with a t-distribution and
a degree of freedom of 0.25, but still slightly underperforms tick-by-tick
rules. With regard to resource efficiency, time savings when using BVC
are considerable, but less so when the available data is not yet vendor-
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compressed and thus has to be aggregated first. Altogether, for our data
set all quote-based rules perform similarly well, with the MEMO rule
providing the highest accuracy.
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